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Bryce C. Tingle*

Bad Company! The Assumptions behind
Proxy Advisors' Voting Recommendations

The corporate governance challenge for Canada is to improve the quality of its
corporate performance, which has been declining relative to its international
peers for decades. This is quite different from the usual assumption that corporate
governance is primarily a matter of controlling managerial self-dealing. While
important, board monitoring of management is only one aspect of its role in a
corporation; research suggests corporate governance arrangements have a
significant impact on corporate outcomes, particularly in areas such as innovation
where Canada lags.
Third-party proxy advisory firms, which provide advice to institutional investors
in Canada on corporate governance matters, have grown in influence over
the past decade. As securities regulators consider whether (and how) to treat
them, an examination of the assumptions that underlie these advisors' voting
recommendations, and the influence these assumptions have on corporate
decision-making, suggest these assumptions create perverse governance
incentives and are contradicted by empirical research on what produces the best
corporate outcomes.

Pour le Canada, le defi que presente la gouvernance d'entreprise est d'ameliorer
la qualite du rendement, laquelle est en declin constant depuis des decennies
par rapport a ce qui se passe dans d'autres pays. Cette situation est fort differente
de Ihypothese habituelle voulant que la gouvernance d'entreprise vise d'abord a
contr6ler les operations entre inities des membres de la direction. La surveillance
de la gestion par le conseil d'administration est certes importante, mais ce
n'est que Fun des volets du r6le du conseil au sein d'une societe par actions; la
recherche suggere d'ailleurs que les arrangements concernant la gouvernance
d'entreprise ont une incidence considerable sur les resultats des societes, en
particulier dans des domaines comme I'innovationou le Canada tire de Iarriere.
Les societes d'expertise-conseil en matiere de procurations donnent aux
investisseurs institutionnels au Canada des conseils sur les questions de
gouvernance d'entreprise; au cours de la derniere decennie, elles ont acquis
une influence grandissante. Tandis que les instances reglementaires en
matiere de valeurs mobilieres se demandent s'il y a lieu de s'interesser a ces
societes (et comment intervenir), un examen des postulats qui sous-tendent les
recommandations de vote de ces conseillers et leur influence sur la prise de
decision des entreprises suggere qu'ils creent des incitatifs pervers en matiere
de gouvernance et sont contredits par la recherche empirique sur les causes des
meilleurs resultats des entreprises.
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Introduction
For more than three decades, the largely unexamined focus of corporate

reformers has been to revitalize shareholder democracy.1 It seemed a
variety of issues arising from the modem separation of ownership and
control could only be resolved if shareholders had better disclosure,
better access to the proxy machinery, and more authority over decisions
historically reserved for the board.2 No reformer anticipated that a principal
1. The modem preoccupation with empowering the shareholders of widely-held corporations is
usually dated to begin with the publication of Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, "Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3:4 Journal of
Financial Economics 305 [Jensen& Meckling, "Theory of the Firm"], although the fundamental issues
arising from the separation of ownership and control have been known since Berle & Means's famous
debate in the Modern Corporationand Private Propertyfirst published in 1932. See Adolf A Berle &
Gardiner C Means, The Modern CorporationandPrivateProperty,10thprinting (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 2009) [Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation].For another classic opinion
on economic theory, see Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, "The Corporate Contract" (1989)
89:7 Colum L Rev 1416. For a more modem analysis of the shareholder primacy debate, see Henry
Hansmann & Reiier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2001) 89:2 Georgetown
U 439 [Hansmann & Kraakman, "End of History"] (proclaiming the success of shareholder primacy
law in corporate governance). See also Lynn A Stout, "On The Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of
Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (In the Closet)" (2013) 36:2 Seattle UL Rev 1169 [Stout, "In
the Closet"] that discusses the history of corporate governance and the rise of shareholder primacy. For
a discussion of shareholder/stakeholder primacy arguments, see notes 104-105.
2.
See for example, Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance
in Canada" (1996) 26 CBLJ 145; Roberta Romano, "Less is More: Making Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance" (2001) 18:85 Yale J on Reg 175. After the enactment
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745 [SOX], Canadian provincial
regulators wanted to signal to capital market participants that the Canadian market was as "strong
and protective of investors' interests as the American Market": see Christopher C Nicholls, "The
Characteristics of Canada's Capital Markets and the Illustrative Case of Canada's Legislative and
Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley," Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada
(15 June 2006). Some reforms from Canadian regulators included: National Instrument 52-108
Auditor Oversight, Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual
and Interim Filings, Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees, National Instrument 58101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance
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beneficiary of these reforms would be an oligopoly of third-party proxy
advisory firms.3
While the magnitude of proxy advisors' direct impact on the
shareholder vote is the subject of some academic debate,4 no one familiar
with the modem boardroom seriously argues with Delaware's Chancellor
Leo Strine's assessment that, "Powerful CEOs come on bended knees to
Rockville, Maryland, where ISS [the dominant advisory firm] resides, to
persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views.... "' Nor would
any director in Canada dispute the assessment of a commission struck by
the New York Stock Exchange that boards routinely ask, "What are the
proxy advisory firms' policies on this action?" 6
In Canada, proxy advisory firms have made the news in several of
the most prominent corporate votes of the last two years. They assisted
in Pershing Square Capital Management's acquisition of control over
Canadian Pacific, and they gave life to Jana Partner's criticisms of the
board of Agrium. 7 They opposed Alimentation Couche Tard's offer for
Guidelines, National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations, National Instrument
52-107 Acceptable Accounting Principles, Auditing Standards, and Reporting Currency, National
Instrument 71-102 Continuous Disclosure and Other Exemptions Relating to Foreign Issuers. For a
detailed overview of these changes, see Tara Gray, "Canadian Response to the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: New Directions for Corporate Governance" (4 October 2005), online: Parliament of
Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0537-e.pdf>; Stephen P Sibold,
"Assessing Canada's Regulatory Response to the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002: Lessons for Canadian
Policy Makers" (2009) 46:3 Alta L Review 769 [Sibold, "Assessing Canada's Regulatory Response"];
Sukanya Pillay, "Forcing Canada's Hand? The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Canadian
Corporate Governance Reform" (2004) 30 Man LJ 285. The Canadian government also enacted
reforms to the Criminal Code dealing with insider trading and various issues involving financial fraud
(Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 3rd Sess, 37th Parl, 2004, (Royal Assent 29 March
2004). Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) changed its corporate
governance guidelines (the "Best Practice Guidelines") as a result of the Dey Report in 1994 (see
Peter Dey, Where Were the Directors? Guidelinesfor Improved CorporateGovernance in Canada,

(December 1994), and the Saucier Committee Report, Joint Committee on Corporate Governance,
"Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture" (21 November 2001), online: <http://www.
ecgi.org/codes/documents/beyond compliance.pdf> ["Saucier Committee Report"]. The guidelines
were further updated 26 April 2002. For an overview of changes prior to and after Sarbanes-OxleyAct,
see Jonathan Lampe & Mark Spiro, "Corporate Governance Developments in Canada" at 45, online:
Goodmans LLP <http://www.goodmans.ca/docs/Corporate/ 2OGovernance/%2ODevelopments / 20
in%20Canada.pdf>. The US also enacted "say-on-pay" legislation under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, §951, 124 Stat 1376 (2010), granting
shareholders a vote on executive compensation.
3.
See the discussion at notes 37-40 on proxy advisory firms.
4.
See discussion at notes 41-42.
5. Leo E Strine, "The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges
We (and Europe) Face" (2005) 30:3 Del J Corp L 673 at 688.
6.

Report of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on CorporateGovernance (23 September

2010) at 15, online: New York Stock Exchange <www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf>.
7.
Scott Deveau, "Corporate culture shift underway in Canada after CP Rail proxy fight," Financial
Post (14 May 2012), online: Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com/2012/05/11/shift-
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Casey's and Kinross's proposal to acquire Red Black, but supported
Equinox Mineral's hostile bid for Lundin Mining. 8 In all these disputes
the opinion of the proxy advisors, particularly ISS, constituted a separate
-and new-arena for conflict among the various interested parties.
It was just a matter of time before regulators became interested in
the only powerful constituency in corporate governance entirely free of
both regulation and legal duties to other parties.9 This paper reviews the
positions taken by the proxy advisory firms in Canada, both in their annual
proxy planning guides and in specific high-profile vote recommendations,
to determine what fundamental assumptions about corporate governance
lie behind them. A companion paper reviews the issues that arise in the
practical day-to-day advisory business of generating tens of thousands of
voting recommendations in Canada."
We often assume that the central issue of corporate governance in
Canada is to prevent managerial self-dealing, as this is generally how
the problem has been characterized in the United States. 1 But this is not
true. The most important public policy challenge faced by Canada in the
area of corporate governance is that our corporations are, as a group,
underperforming. The OECD has observed that Canada's productivity
performance has, in recent decades, been the worst of all the G7 countries

underway-for-canadas-clubby-corporate-culture-after-cp-rail-proxy-fight/>;
Peter Koven, "Jana
predicts two dissident candidates will join Agrium board," FinancialPost (8 April 2013), online:
Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/08/jana-predicts-two-dissident-candidateswill-join-agrium-board/> [Koven, "Jana Predicts"].
8. YvanAllaire, "The Troubling Case of Proxy Advisors: Some Policy Recommendations" (January
2013) Policy Paper No. 7 at 21, online: Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations
(IGOPP) <http://www.igopp.org/IMG/pdf/pp troublingcaseproxyadvisors-pp7 short 3 .pdf>.
9.
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on the US Proxy System (2010)
File no. S7-14-10, online: Securities and Exchange Commission <htp://www.sec.gov/rules/
concept/2010/34-62495.pdf>; Autorite des Marches Financiers (AMF), AMF Recommendation 201106 on Proxy Voting Advisory Firms (18 March 2011), translation available online: <http://www.amffrance.org/en US/Reglementation/Doctrine/Doctrine-list/Doctrine.html?category I+-+Issuers+and
+financial+disclosure&docld workspace 03A%02F%o2FSpacesStore%o2Fl2elaead-Off9-4f26-fdOd0ebe29d0efe>; Canadian Securities Administrators Consultation Paper 25-401: Potential Regulation
of Proxy Advisory firms, OSC CSA Notice, (2012) 35 OSCB 5681 ["CSA Consultation Paper"].
10. Bryce C Tingle, "The Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms," (forthcoming) ["Proxy
Advisory Firms"].
11. Daniel JH Greenwood, "Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees,
Revisited" (1996) 69:3 Southern Calif Law Rev 1021 at 1023: "Virtually all major groups of
corporate law scholars today agree on the centrality of the shareholder to corporate law; all but the
communitarians agree that virtually the sole task of corporate law is to ensure that mangers act as
agents for the shareholder owners." See also: Hansmann & Kraakman, "End of History," supra note 1;
Edward B Rock, "Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?" (1997) 44:4 UCLA
L Rev 1009; and Bernard S Black, "Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice" (1992) 39:4 UCLA Law Rev 811.
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and identifies it as Canada's "key" long-term challenge.12 The Bank of
Canada recently pointed out that since 2005 labour productivity in Canada
has grown by just 0.5 per cent annually, compared with 2.1 per cent in
the U.S.13 Canada's productivity levels now rank in the bottom quartile of
the OECD.14 The failures of Canada's corporations to compete effectively
mean that Canada has lost considerable ground to other OECD countries
in terms of living standards.15 The World Economic Forum dropped
Canada's ranking in world competitiveness from seventh in 2000 to tenth
in 2010.16 When it comes to research and development, and other measures
17
of innovation we rank much further down the pack.
As well, Canada's public markets have declined in their attractiveness
to new businesses, with all the implications that has for the country's
competiveness, cost of capital and ability to nurture large-scale globally
competitive companies.18 I have argued elsewhere the significant decline
in the IPO market in this country is due to the disadvantages experienced
by corporate managers in being public.19 Most of these disadvantages are
connected to our relatively new corporate governance regime.
Itwould be wrong, therefore, to see the question ofcorporate governance
in Canada as somehow ancillary to our shared life. Every Canadian
should care a great deal about how we can improve the governance of our
corporations. Research has repeatedly connected corporate governance
2
regimes with corporate performance, particularly innovation and R&D. 1
12.

OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada,Economic Surveys, vol 2012, No 12, (2012) at 28,

online: <http://www.oecd-ilibmry.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-canada-2012 eco surveyscan-2012-en>.
13. Tiff Macklem, "Canada's Competitive Imperative: Investing in Productivity Gains" (Speech
delivered at Productivity Alberta's Luncheon Series, 2 February 2011), online: <http://www.
bankofcanada.ca/2011/02/publications/speeches/canada-competitive-imperative-investing-2/>.
See
also Report of the Expert Panel on Business Innovation, Innovation & Business Strategy: Why Canada

Falls Short (June 2009), online: Council of Canadian Academies <http://www.scienceadvice.ca/
uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications%20and%20news%20releases/inno/%282009-06110%29%/20innovation% 20report.pdf>.

14. Aggregate Income and Productivity Trends: Canada vs United States, 1961-2011 (18 June
2012), online: <http://www.csls.ca/data/iptl.asp>.
15. Conference Board of Canada, How Canada Performs: Detail and Analysis (current as of March,
2013), online: <http://www.csls.ca/data/iptl.asp>.
16.

Klaus Schwab et al, "The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011" (2010), online: World

Economic Forum <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF GlobalCompetitivenessReport2010-11.
pdf>.

17. In 2010, Canada ranked 20th on R&D spending and 19th in innovation: Soumitra Dutta & Irene
Mia, eds, "The Global Information Technology Report 2010-2011" (2011), online: World Economic
Forum <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF GITR Report 2011.pdf>.

18.

Bryce C Tingle et al, (2013) "The IPO Market in Canada: What a Comparison with the United

States Tells Us About a Global Problem" 54 Can Bus LJ 321.
19. Ibid.

20.

See, for example, Jie He et al, "The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation"
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Commentators from Warren Buffett21 to the global managing director of
McKinsey & Company,22 to the current U.K. government23 have called
for changes to the current corporate governance regime, which they see
as interfering with long-term growth rates. This paper asks whether proxy
advisory firms, the most influential of the new participants in Canada's
new corporate governance regime, are part of the problem.
I. The rise ofproxy advisoryfirms and their influence
Like much of the developed world, Canada witnessed a transformation of
its capital markets in the past half-century.24 Previously, nearly all shares in
Canada were owned and voted directly by individual investors; now large
blocks of these shares, particularly in the largest TSX-listed companies,
are owned and voted by intermediary institutions such as pension and
mutual funds. While individuals remain, in some sense, "owners" of
the securities held by these institutional investors, their "ownership" is

(2013) 109:3 Journal of Financial Economics 856; Andrew Prevost et al, "Of What Value Are
Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?" (2000) 73:2 The Journal of Business
177; William Johnson et al, "The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO
Firms" (29 April 2013), online: SSRN <htp://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1923667>; Natalie Mizik,
"The Theor and Practice of Myopic Management" (2010) 47:4 Journal of Marketing Research 594;
Aleksandra Kacperczyk, "With Greater Power Comes Greater Responsibility" (2009) 30:3 Strategic
Management Journal 261; Brian Bushee, "Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings Over
Long-rn Value?" (2001) 18:2 Contemporary Accounting Research 207; Brian Bushee, "The Influence
of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behaviour" (1998) 73:3 The Accounting Review
305; William Pugh et al, "Antitakeover Charter Amendments: Effects on Corporate Decisions" (1992)
15:1 Journal of Financial Research 57; Campbell Harvey et al, "Value Destruction and Financial
Reporting Decisions" (2006) 62:6 Financial Analysts Journal 27; and Pavlos Masouros, Corporate
Law and Economic Stagnation: How Shareholder Value and Short-termism Contributeto the Decline

of the Western Economies (Eleven International Publishing, 2013).
21. Warren Buffett, "Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach
to Investment and Business Management" (2009), online: The Aspen Institute <htp://www.
aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/B SPPonlineBroch.pdf>.
22. Dominic Barton, "Capitalism for the Long-Term, McKinsey on Cooperatives" (2012), online:
McKinsey & Company <htp://www.mckinsey.com/client service/strategy/latest thinking/mckinsey
on cooperatives>.
23. John Kay, "The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making" (July
2012), online: The United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation and Skills <htp://bis.gov.
uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12 -917-kay-review-or-equity-markets-final-report.pdf> [Kay,
"The Kay Review"]; and Vince Cable (Secretary of State, Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills), "Ensuring Equity Markets Support Long-Term Growth: The Government Response to the Kay
Review" (November 2012), online: United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation and Skills
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/253457/bis-12-1188equity -markets- support-growth-response-to kay-reviewpdf>.
24. Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada" (1996)
26:2 Can Bus LJ 145 at 146 [Macintosh, "Institutional Shareholders"]: "the total assets of banks, life
insurance companies, trusteed pension plans, trust and loan corporations, mutual funds, local credit
unions and Caisses Populaires (measured in constant 1986 dollars) has grown from $267 billion in
1969 to $1.2 trillion in 1990."

Bad Company! The Assumptions behind
Proxy Advisors' Voting Recommendations

715

essentially a shared undivided interest in a portfolio of securities selected,
managed and voted by professional fund managers.
In Canada, 32% of the shares of TSX-listed issuers are held by
institutions, 25 which are estimated to be responsible for two-thirds of the
trades on the TSX by dollar volume. 26 A similar trend can be seen in the
United States, where institutional share ownership has gone from 6.10% in
1950 to 50.6% in 2009.27 Indeed, institutional investors held 73% of the
28
thousand largest U.S. corporations that year.
John Coffee points out the consequences of this concentration of
share ownership in the hands of intermediaries: money managers show
"limited interest in corporate governance issues... because the expected
gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and received
by investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and borne
by money managers.1 29 This should be immediately familiar as a new
instantiation of the principal-agent problem central to any discussion of
the governance of widely-held companies.
Fund managers are rewarded according to their performance relative
to other fund managers and certain benchmarks, such as the TSX
Composite Index." Clever and conscientious voting of the shares in their
portfolios affects the relative performance of those portfolios far less than
the selection of investee companies in the first place and the timing of
trades in those companies.31 As well, efforts undertaken to improve the
governance of portfolio companies benefit other fund managers and the
25. CSA Consultation Paper, supra note 9 at 5684.
26. Shamsud D Chowdhury & Eric Z Wang, "Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation:
A Time-Series Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations" (2009) 35:1 Journal of Management 5 at 7
[Chowdhury & Wang, "Institutional Activism Types"].
27. Matteo Tonello & Stephen Rabimov, "The 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in
Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition" (2010) Research Report R-1468-10-RR at 22, table

10, online: The Conference Board of Canada Inc <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.
aspx?did-3890>; Jeffrey N Gordon, "The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices" (2007) 59:6 Stan L Rev 1465 at 1568, table 4
and figure 6.

28. Gordon, supra note 27. In its recent petition to the SEC on proxy advisors, NASDAQ advises
that institutional share ownership now exceeds 75%: NASDAQ OI\LX Group, Inc Petition to SEC (8
October 2013) at 2, online: SEC <https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-666.pdf>.
29. John C Coffee, "Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor"
(1991) 91:6 Colum L Rev 1277 at 1317-1328. See also, Jill E Fisch, "Securities Intermediaries and
the Separation of Ownership and Control" (2010) 33:4 Seattle UL Rev 877 at 879; and Stephen M
Bainbridge, Corporate Governance After the FinancialCrisis (New York: Oxford University Press,

2012) at 247-248 [Bainbridge, "After the Financial Crisis"].
30. Michael K Berkowitz & Yehuda Kotowitz, "Incentives and Efficiency in the Market for
Management Services: A Study of Canadian Mutual Funds" (1993) 26:4 Canadian Journal of
Economics 850.
31. Bernard S Black & John C Coffee Jr, "Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under
Limited Regulation" (1994) 92:7 MichL Rev 1997 at 2063-2064.
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benchmark indices that include those companies, eliminating any relative
performance advantage that would accrue to the money manager.
Thus, we would expect the men and women who control significant
percentages of Canada's share capital to pay little attention to corporate
voting-and that is more or less what we see. 32 Many institutional investors
in Canada simply do not vote their shares except in high-stakes contested
votes. (Canadian fund mangers have a "duty" but not a legal obligation
to vote.33) Other institutional investors vote their shares, but like Fidelity
Investments, conduct their proxy voting through a separate internal group,
without providing for input or recommendations from portfolio managers
or research analysts.34 Even if there were incentives for money managers
to carefully scrutinize the proxy materials of the companies they own in
their portfolios, the sheer number of these companies would probably
defeat such efforts. As proxy advisor Glass Lewis & Co., notes, "Most
institutions do not have adequate in-house resources to ensure that the
right decisions are being made on the hundreds or thousands of proxies
they vote each year."35
Various attempts to measure the involvement of institutional investors
in the proxy process have tended to support this picture of disengagement.36
For example, a survey of shareholder proposals in the United States found
that mutual funds were the architects of only 4.5% of all shareholder
proposals, and 80% of these concerned social and environmental issues
unconnected with the basic business and financial performance of the

32. This is a well-known phenomenon that first achieved prominence in Berle & Means, The
Modern Corporation,supra note 1. See as well, Lynn A Stout, "The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder
Control," Regulation (Spring 2007) 42, online: <htp://www.cato.org/regulation/spring-2007> [Stout,
"Mythical Benefits"]; MacIntosh, "Institutional Shareholders," supra note 24 at 153-154; Edward B
Rock, "The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism" (1991) 79:3
Geo LJ 445 at 460-463; Simon CY Wong, "Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional
Investors" [2010] Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law at 406.
33. See Discussion Paper, "The Quality of the Shareholder Vote in Canada" (22 October 2010) at
169, online: Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP <http://www.dwpv.com/Sites/shareholdervoting/
mediaiThe-Quality-of-the-Shareholder-Vote-in-Canada.pdf>: "That duty will typically (but may not
always) require the institutional investor to vote its shares, whether to protect the long-term value of
the investment or to approve or disapprove an action or even that may affect the investment in the short
term."

34. Fidelity Funds' Proxy Voting Guidelines (November 2011), online: Fidelity Investments <http:/
www.fidelity.ca/cs/Satellite/en/public/products/regulatory documents/proxy voting/guidelines>.
35. Glass, Lewis & Co Products and Services (31 August 2013), online: LinkedIn <http://www.
linkedin.com/company/glass-lewis-&-co./products>.
36. See, e.g., Robert C Pozen, "Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists" HarvardBusiness
Review (1994) at 140, 144, online: Harvard Business Review <htp://hbr.org/1994/01/institutionalinvestors-the-reluctant-activists/ar/l>; Bernard S Black, "Shareholder Activism and Corporate
Governance in the United States" (1998) 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law
459 at 460 [Black, "Shareholder Activism"].
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company.37 Extensive empirical evidence from the IPO market suggests
that institutional investors do not prefer companies that give them stronger
governance rights.38 Rather they cheerfully pay premiums for companies
with poison pills, staggered boards and two-tier voting structures in
a process that Professor Lynn Stout analogizes to Ulysses seeing the
advantage of tying his own hands.39
Proxy advisory firms are intended to solve the problems surrounding
institutional voting. They specialize in reviewing the proxy materials that
accompany shareholder meetings, and issuing recommendations on how
shareholders should vote. The cost of these services is shared by their
many clients, all of whom are institutional investors. On the face of it,
proxy advisory firms have a business model that incentivizes them to
provide accurate voting guidance to their clients, the professional money
managers. Bad advice should, over time, lead to a decline in proxy firms'
market share.40 Advisory firms can bring the dedicated resources needed
to review and evaluate the tens of thousands of specific matters that come
up for vote each year in Canada's public markets. If investment funds
organize themselves around research, selecting stock and trading, proxy
advisory firms can focus on reviewing information circulars and evaluating
corporate governance.
There is some controversy about the actual influence of proxy advisory
firms on the shareholder vote. The Investment Company Institute undertook
a massive study of proxy votes by funds and found that while, "funds vote
proxies in accordance with their board-approved guidelines.., fund voting
patterns are often broadly consistent with vote recommendations of proxy
advisory firms."4 1 The position of investment funds, as well as the proxy
37. Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey N Gordon, "The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights" (2013) 113:4 ColumLRev 863 at 887. See also,
Roberta Romano, "Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate
Governance" (2001) 18 Yale J onReg 174 at 181 [Romano, "Less is More"].
38. Stout, "In the Closet," supra note 1 at 1182-1183; Brandon S Gold, "Agents Unchained: The
Determinants of Takeover Defenses in IPO Firms" (2013), online: Social Science Research Network
<htp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-2262095>.
39.

Stout, "Mythical Benefits," supra note 32 at 45.

40. There are, however, scholars who argue that the value of proxy advisors to institutional investors
is not actually a function of the accuracy of their voting recommendations, but rather acts as a source
of "criticism insurance" (Larry Ribstein, "Larry Ribstein on The Corporate Governance Industry"
(12 June 2006), online: The Conglomerate Blog <htp://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/06/the
corporate g.html>) or as a source of useful noise: "low-quality ratings make it harder to hold them
[investors] accountable for poor decision making or poor outcomes associated with those investment
decisions." Charles W Calomiris & Joseph R Mason, "Conflicts of Interest, Low Quality Ratings,
and Meaningful Reform of Credit and Corporate Governance Ratings" (19 April 2010), online: e21
Economic Policies forthe 21st Century <http://economics2l.org/files/pdfs/commentary/04

19 2010

calomiris mason governance.pdf>.
41. Sean Collins, "Proxy Voting by Registered Investment Companies: Promoting the Interests of
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advisors themselves, is that this is a case of correlation, not causation. 42
Poor corporate governance will be just as visible to investment funds acting
independently as it will to a proxy advisor. Professional money managers
claim they find the proxy advisors' recommendations useful, but say they
43
are just one factor taken into consideration when choosing how to vote.
The corporate subjects of proxy advisors' recommendations have a very
different perspective. It is almost uniformly believed by issuers that proxy
advisors swing between 10% and 25% of the votes cast at shareholder
meetings. The responses filed in connection with the CSA request for
comment concerning proxy advisors turned up similar estimates of their
44
influence .
Scholars disagree about proxy advisors' direct impact on shareholder
voting. One study found that a negative recommendation from ISS with
respect to a director reduced the votes cast in his orher favour by over 20% in
circumstances where there are no obvious firm performance or governance

Fund Shareholders" (10 July 2008) 14 Research Perspective 1, online: Investment Company Institute
<http://www.ici.org/pdf/perl 4 -01.pdf>.
42. Comment letter from Katherine H Rabin & Robert McCormick for Glass Lewis & Co on
CSA Consultation Paper 25-401 Potential Regulation of Proxy Advisory Firms (20 September
2012), online: Ontario Securities Commission <hatp://www.osc.gov.onca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory2-Comments/com 20120920 25-401 rabink mccormickr.pdf>; Comment letter from
Debra L Sisti & Martha Carter for ISS on CSA Consultation Paper 25-401 Potential Regulation of
Proxy Advisory Firms (10 August 2012), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.
gov.onca/documents/enlSecurities-Category2-Comments/com 20120810 25-401 sistid carterm.
pdf>.
43. See for example, Portfolio Management Association of Canada, Letter to CSA, 21 September
2012 at 2: "Such recommendations are exactly that-recommendations only-and most investors,
if not all, will evaluate matters independently, thoroughly and in their own unique decision making
process...'; Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, Letter to CSA, 21 September 2012 at 6: "At Teachers',
proxy advisory firms provide us withjust one of the many inputs in our proxy voting decision making
process"; RBC Global Asset Management Inc, Letterto CSA, 20 September 2012 at 2: "ISS and Glass,
Lewis, through their guidelines, research reports and voting recommendations, are only two sources of
information on which our guidelines and voting decisions are based"; and TIAA-CREF, Letter to CSA,
21 September 2012 at 2: "we prepare and follow our own internal proxy voting guidelines, using proxy
advisory firm research solely as an informational tool to supplement our internally produced research.
Moreover, we formulate our own voting decisions in-house.... In sum, these [proxy advisory] services
inform and facilitate, but do not substitute for TIAA-CREF's exercise of independent judgment in
arriving at our own decisions on how to direct the voting of portfolio company shares...." All letters
to CSA available online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/36504.htm>.
44. See, e.g., CI Financial, Letter to CSA, 21 September 2012 at 4 discussing a director who attracted
a withhold vote one year from ISS: "That other director had almost 16% of the shares withheld from
his election Prior to this, and again at the [next] annual meeting in 2011, his election was supported
by over 99% of the shares voted." Bennett Jones, CSA Letter, at 2: referring to "large swings" in
the vote attributable to proxy advisors. Astral Media Inc, Letter to CSA, 21 September 2012 at 2:
"ISS recommendations will always influence the outcome of a vote and, depending on the percentage
of votes held by institutions that vote in accordance with ISS recommendations, may determine the
outcome of a vote" [emphasis in the original]. Letters to CSA available online: OSC <http://www.osc.
gov.on.ca/en/36504.htm>.

Bad Company! The Assumptions behind
Proxy Advisors' Voting Recommendations

719

anomalies.45 Another study concluded that ISS swayed between 13.6% and
20.6% of the vote.4 6 However, a more recent study attempting a different
research methodology found that "the impact of an ISS recommendation
ranges from 6% to 130% for the median company.147 In contested elections
there is evidence to show proxy advisors' recommendations serve to
"certify" dissident campaigns and have a larger effect than usual.4"
It should be observed that even the low end of the range for proxy firm
influence-nearer 10% than 20% for example-represents a great deal
of power in a widely held firm. IBM submitted data to the SEC which it
claimed, "is evidence for de facto control" of IBM by proxy advisors.49
Over the previous two years, 11.9% (2010) and 13.5% (2009) of IBM's
shares were voted in conformity with ISS's recommendations within one
day after ISS published those recommendations.
"By comparison, for the previous five business days, no more than 0.20%
and 0.27% of the total IBM votes were cast in any one day in 2009 and
2010, respectively. To put that into proper perspective, the IBM voting
block essentially controlled by ISS has more influence on the voting
results than IBM's largest shareholder... [a] voting block.. controlled by
51
a proxy advisory finn that has no economic stake in the company ....
The Agrium proxy battle this year provides insight into the situation in
Canada. An activist investor, Jana Partners, had engaged in an escalating
war of words with the board and management of Agrium over a variety
of strategic, governance and financial issues. 1 Underpinning many of

45.

Jie Cai, Jacqueline L Garner & Ralph A Walking, "Electing Directors" (2009) 64:5 Journal of

Finance 2389 at 2401. See also Angela Morgan, Annette B Poulsen& Jack G Wolf, "The Evolution of

Shareholder Voting for Executive Compensation Schemes" (2006) 12:4 Journal of Corporate Finance
715 at 715-737 (finding the impact of ISS recommendations is greater than 20% on compensationrelated issues).
46.

Jennifer E Bethel& Stuart L Gillan, "The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment

on Shareholder Voting" (2002) 31:4 Financial Management 29 at 46.
47. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, "Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors"
(2009) 82:4 S Cal L Rev 649 at 906.

48. Cindy R Alexander et al, "The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting" [2009] National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 15143 at 28 and 34, online: National Bureau of
Economic Research <http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5143.pdf?new windowl>.
49. Comment letter from Andrew Bonzani for International Business Machines Corporation, on the
US Securities and Exchange Commission "Concept Release of the US Proxy System" Release No.
34-62495 File No. S7-14-10 (15 October 2010) at 2, online: US SEC <http://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-14-10/s71410-84.pdf>.
50. Ibid at 3.

51. See Institutional Shareholder Services Inc, Proxy Paper: Agrium Inc (26 March 2013) at 17 for
a list of key events in the contested proxy battle ["ISS Proxy Paper"]; see also Amanda Stephenson,
"Agrium Wins Proxy Fight; all Five Jana Nominees Rejected," CalgaryHerald(9 April 2013), online:
<http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/Agrium+wins+proxy+fight+five+ Jana+nominees+reject
ed/8218133/story.html>.
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Jana's complaints about strategy was a valuation metric (measuring
total shareholder return) that was quite different from the metric used
by even the third-party analysts following the company. 2 Unusually for
these scenarios, nearly all of the largest shareholders of Agrium ended
up supporting the board. 3 (Quite often the activist shareholder succeeds
in convincing long term shareholders a change is required, or the run
up in share price occasioned by an activist campaign induces long-term
shareholders to take profits, and voting control moves towards shorterterm speculators with an investment thesis that depends on the proposed

changes. 4 ) As well, Glass Lewis, Egan-Jones and a small European
advisory firm came out in favour of Agrium.5
Into this apparent consensus came the recommendation of Institutional

Shareholder Services (ISS) late in the process: three ofthe Agrium directors
should be replaced by two members ofthe slate proposed by Jana Partners,
including founder Barry Rosenstein. 6 This would create a nine-person
board that included both sides of a fight that had been conducted publicly
and was repeatedly characterized as "vicious" and "dirty" in the press. A
foretaste of possible future board meetings was Barry Rosenstein's 'jaw
dropping rant" (the phrase used by newspaper reporters) at the shareholder

meeting after the voting results were announced.

8

52. Ibid at 21-25. Glass Lewis & Co Proxy Paper: Agrium Inc (26 March 2013) at 14 ["Glass
Lewis Proxy Paper"]: "After considering the presented arguments, we ultimately find the Dissident's
position, which relies, in part, on less common quantitative methodologies, offers insufficient cause to
support the election of its nominees...."
53. Peter Koven, "Jana's Agrium proxy battle had little chance of succeeding," FinancialPost (12
April 2013), online: Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/12/agrium-story/>.
54. See the study by April Klein & Emanuel Zur, "Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors" (2009) 64:1 The Journal of Finance 184 at 225: "Activists are
extremely successful in getting existing management to acquiesce to their demands as articulated in
the initial 13D filing, with hedge funds enjoying a success rate of 60% and nonhedge fund activists
accomplishing their objectives 65% of the time. Both groups are particularly successful at gaining
board representation on the target firm within one year of the initial finding."
55. "Glass Lewis Proxy Paper," supra note 52; Egan-Jones Ratings Company, "Proxy Report
#210497" (Agrium Inc) (21 March 2013); Pension & Investment Research Consultants Limited,
Proxy Paper: Agrium Inc (21 March, 2013).
56. "ISS Proxy Paper," supra note 51 at 31.
57. Scott Haggett, "Agrium Sweeps Proxy Vote, Jana Cries Foul," Reuters (9 April 2013), online:
Reuters
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/agrium-jana-idUSL2NOCW1PM20130409>;
and Peter Koven, "Jana Predicts Two Dissident Candidates Will Join Agrium Board," FinancialPost
(8 April 2013), online: Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/08/jana-predictstwo-dissident-candidates-will-join-agrium-board/>.
58. Ibid. A reporter from The Wall Street Journal simply referred to it, as "not exactly gracious" and
"remarkable": Ronald Barusch, "Dealpolitk: Agrium Lesson for Activists: Don't underestimate the
Adversary" (12 April 2013), The Wall Street Journal (blog), online: Deal Journal <http://blogs.wsj.
com/deals/2013/04/12/dealpolitik-agrium-lesson-for-activists-dont-underestimate-the-adversary/>.
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The strange suggestion by ISS that a board be made up of two groups
with fundamental differences of opinion on strategy and even how to
value the business, along with a history of bad blood and publicly-aired
criticisms of one another, provides an interesting test of proxy advisors'
power in Canada. How many institutional investors went along with this
counter-intuitive recommendation? According to Agrium, roughly 12% of
its shares were voted in favour of ISS's proposed slate in the days after its
recommendations were published. 9
In many ways the debate over the percentage of votes effectively
"directed" by advisory firm recommendations is misleading. What actually
matters is the general impact of proxy advisory firms on the governance
of Canadian public companies. Decisions undertaken by directors for the
sole purpose of satisfying ISS's proxy planning guidelines are as much a
measure of influence as calculating vote tallies. In this respect, the widely
held belief among businesspeople that proxy advisory firms influence "a
third or more" of the vote is the key statistic."
A recent survey conducted by the Conference Board, NASDAQ
and the Stanford Rock Center found that over 70 per cent of directors
and executive officers reported that their compensation decisions were
influenced by the published guidelines of proxy advisory firms.61 An
earlier study asking a slightly different question had found that 54 per cent
of companies had actually changed their compensation scheme within the
previous three years primarily to meet the standards of a proxy advisory
firm. 62

No similar survey appears to have been performed in Canada, but
when the SEC review of proxy advisory firms began in 2010, a consulting
firm that works closely with Canadian boards opined: "Canadian proxy
voting outcomes are affected by the voting recommendations of U.S.
based proxy advisors in the same way and largely to the same extent as
63
those in the U.S.

59. Notes on file with author, based on discussions with Agrium executives on 29 April 2013.
60. Paul Rose, "The Corporate Governance Industry" (2007) 32:4 J Corp L 887 at 889.
61. David F Larcker et al, "The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations on
Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation Decisions" (March 2012), online: Stanford Business
Center for Leadership Development and Research <http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr/research!
surveys/proxy.html>.
62. Center on Executive Compensation, "A Call for Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status
Quo: The Case for Greater Accountability and Oversight" (January 2011) at 4, online: <http://www.
executivecompensatioaorg/docs/cI -07b%2OProxy%/20Advisory% 20 White% 20Paper.pdf>.
63. Hugessen Consulting Inc, "SEC Takes a Look at Proxy Advisory Firms," (August 2010) Briefing,
online: Hugessen Consulting Inc <http://www.hugessen.com/pdf docs/Briefings - Proxy Advisors
SEC Release august 17.pdf>.
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To anyone familiar with the modem Canadian boardroom, there is
little doubt that proxy advisory firms cast a long shadow across the table.
Even if the board is confident that it can win a vote over the negative
recommendation of ISS, having a significant number of shareholders
vote against a management proposal is considered an embarrassment to
be avoided if at all possible, and significant institutional opposition to
a resolution interferes with building strong relationships with the major
shareholders.
ISS states in its proxy planning guides that board decisions it
disapproves of (such as approving a non-conforming compensation
scheme) may result in negative recommendations made against specific
directors in future annual general meetings.64 In a similar vein, part of
the rationale ISS offered for supporting Jana's dissident directors was that
Agrium corporate governance was deficient.65 Thus, even if the directors
feel they can achieve victory on the matter at hand, they will worry about
the impact of their choices on future proxy recommendations. Few boards
are willing to alienate ISS, because few boards are confident that they will
never need ISS's help in the future.66

II. Proxy advisoryfirm voting recommendations
If proxy advisory firms have significant influence over the governance of
Canadian corporations, how do they use it? Late each year ISS publishes
its "Canadian Proxy Voting Guidelines" for TSX and TSX Venture

64.

Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., "2013 Canadian Proxy Voting Guidelines, TSX Listed

Companies" (19 December 2012) at 10-11, online: ISS <http://www.issgovernance.com/files/20131S

SCanadianTSXGuidelines.pdf> ["ISS Guidelines TSX"].
65. "ISS Proxy Paper," supra note 51 at 23 (questioning the board's capital allocation and its
commitment to total shareholder value: "[t]hat the board now points to Agrium's dividend yield

as highly competitive among-though not outpacing-peers also suggests a lack of urgency...."),
25 (questioning the board's management of its retail business), 25-6 (arguing deficiencies in the
competencies of the existing board members), 26 (questioning board strategy), 27 (referring to the
board as having "a burgeoning credibility problem" and wondering whether the shareholders can trust
the board going forward), 30 ("the board has taken some questionable actions, which raise questions
about its credibility" and suggesting the existing board is incapable of taking an "unbiased" look at
Agrium's business).
66. According to one report: "There were 42 cases of shareholder activism among Canadian firms
last year [2012], almost double the 22 a year earlier, according to Kingsdale Shareholder Services Inc,
the firm involved in 85% of the country's proxy battles" (see Katia Dmitrieva & Sean B Pasternak,
"Ackman-Like Activism Spurs Agrium, SNC Rallies" Bloomberg News (13 February 2013), online:
Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-13/ackman-like-activism-spurs-agrium-sncrallies-corporate-canada.html>); While the number of proxy contests declined in 2013, it was still 450%

higher than the average for the five years ending in 2007. The report also notes that activists succeeded
in two-thirds of board-related contests last year: Fasken Martineau LLP, Canadian Proxy Contest
Study-2014 Update, at 2 and 5, online: Fasken Martineau <http://www.fasken.com/en/canadianproxy-contests-2013-in-review/>.
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companies for the following year.67 These guidelines are designed to assist
issuers to understand the basis on which ISS will be generating its voting
recommendations over the coming year. A companion paper discusses
exactly how these Voting Guidelines are developed and the practical issues
arising from attempts to follow the recommendations." Here we will
examine what the Voting Guidelines assume constitutes good corporate
governance.
The Voting Guidelines are generated by ISS based on an annual policy
survey of institutional investors about corporate governance, combined
with industry roundtables and feedback from market participants. 69 In
general they reflect the conventional wisdom about corporate governance
assumed by academics, regulators and activists-a conventional wisdom
not necessarily supported by empirical research.7 1 Without insisting that
the guidelines are wrong, this distinction suggests the possibility that they
might be. The lack of empirical research also highlights an important point:
proxy advisory firms are concerned that their voting recommendations
reflect the opinions and prejudices of their clients, the institutional
investors; it matters less to proxy firms whether the governance regime
reflected in their voting guidelines is correct.
1. The monitoring board
The Joint Committee on Corporate Governance struck by the TSX (the
Saucier Committee) reflected on the ultimate goal of corporate governance
in Canada:
The objective of corporate governance is to promote strong, viable
and competitive corporations. Boards of directors are stewards of the
corporation's assets and their behaviour should be focused on adding
value to those assets by working with management to build a successful
corporation and enhance shareholder value."
This conception of the board's role aligns it with not just the longterm interests of corporate stakeholders, but with Canada's need for
competitive, innovative and successful companies. However, very soon

67.

"ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 5; see also Institutional Shareholder Services Inc, "2013

Canadian Proxy Voting Guidelines, Venture Companies" (19 December 2012), online: ISS <http:/
www.issgovernance.com/files/2013ISSCanadianVentureGuidelines.pdf>.
68. Bryce C Tingle, "Proxy Advisory Firms," supra note 10.
69. David F Larcker, Allan L McCall & Brian Tayan, "And Then A Miracle Happens!: How Do
Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?" Stanford Rock Center for Corporate
Governance, Closer Look Series-CGRP31 (25 February 2013), online: <http://www.gsb.stanford.
edu/cldr/research/closer look.html> at 3 [Larcker, McCall & Tayan, "Then A Miracle Happens!"].
70. Bryce C Tingle, "Proxy Advisory Firms," supra note 10.
71. Saucier Committee Report, supra note 2 at 7.
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after the Saucier Committee issued this report, the frauds of Enron came to
light, the various scandals of that era achieved a cultural critical mass, and
discussions about corporate governance came to be dominated by a very
narrow subset of board responsibilities: monitoring management.
There is no question that providing an independent check on
management is an essential aspect of protecting the company's interests,
but it is only one facet of the board's overall responsibility. Boards must
also work with management to develop strategy and make plans that
will allow the company to succeed in its markets. They must provide a
sounding board for the CEO, and assist him or her in solving the problems
confronting the company. They must, in other words, contribute more than
mere independence to the company.7 2
Nevertheless, ISS's voting recommendations fundamentally assume
that the board should function almost exclusively as a monitoring device.
Section after section of ISS's 2013 Canadian Proxy Voting Guidelines for
TSX-Listed Companies concerns itself exclusively with independence
and the degree of control the board manifests over managerial behaviour
in circumstances like compensation, where conflicts of interest exist.
The Guidelines may state that "[i]ndependent oversight of management
is a primary responsibility of the board," implying there are other
responsibilities, but these other responsibilities never enter into the actual
voting recommendations. 3 The Guidelines even discuss board "skills,
experience and competencies," but these nevergenerate voting outcomes.7 4
What does generate voting outcomes? In nearly every case it is
"independence." "Withhold" recommendations will be issued where
the board lacks an independent majority, or when a board lacks separate
compensation or nominating committees, or when insiders sit on
those committees, or if the board fails to replace management when
,.appropriate."" Other voting recommendations require the separation
of the Chair and CEO roles, 6 support shareholder proposals asking for
independent super-majorities on the board, 7 criticize poison pills that
put the decision to sell in the hands of the board," censure directors that

72.

See Jonathan R Macey, Corporate Governance:Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 51-68 [Macey, CorporateGovernance] for an overview of
the various responsibilities of boards.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

"ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 5.
Ibid at 6.
Ibid at 8-9, 12.
Ibid at 13.
Ibid at 13.
Ibid at 17.
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approve executive compensation schemes that are too generous and do not
sufficiently reflect pay-for-performance, 9 among others.
ISS's curious recommendation of a hybrid board in the case ofAgrium
makes sense if the board is understood almost exclusively as a device to
monitor management. The addition of two hostile directors to the ranks
of the board would only improve the level of scrutiny-the passionate
searching for managerial failure and self-dealing-which makes up
the monitoring function. From a monitoring perspective it is irrelevant
that management would begin censoring and managing the information
provided to the board, that the trust necessary for any group of individuals
to collaborate would evaporate, or that profound disagreements and rancor
would paralyze a body that typically acts by consensus.
There is a great deal of empirical research on the performance of
boards dominated by independent directors, and very little of it supports the
overwhelming emphasis given to it by ISS. Bhagat and Black conclude,
79. Ibid at 25.
80. For the first large-scale long-term study on whether board independence correlates with greater
corporate performance, see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, "The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance" (2002) 27:2 J Corp L 231 at 233 [Bhagat & Black,
"The Non-Correlationf'] ("Firms with more independent boards do not perform better than other
firms"); Benjamin E Hermalin & Michael S Weisbach, "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature" (2003) 9:1 Economic Policy Review 7
at 20: (surveying economic literature and finding "board composition is not related to corporate
performance"); Roberta Romano, "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance" (2005) 114:7 Yale LJ 1521 [Romano, "Quack Corporate Governance"] (provides a
summary of empirical studies showing that firm performance is not improved with independent
directors); Usha Rodrigues, "Fetishization of Independence" (2008) 33:2 J Corp L 447. For examples
of studies concerning the relationship between board composition and firm performance, see: Paul W
MacAvoy et al, "ALI Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board of Directors:
An Economic Analysis" (1983) in Statement of The Business Roundtable on the American Law
Institute's Proposed "Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and
Recommendations" (performing an empirical evaluation the American Law Institute's proposed
mechanism to increase corporate fiduciary responsibility and concluding that there is no significant
relationship between board composition and corporate performance); Anup Agrawal & Charles R
Knoeber, "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and
Shareholders" (1996) 31:3 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 377 at 389-394 (finding
director independence, along with more debt financing and activity in the market for corporate control,
actually reduces company performance); Stephen M Bainbridge, "A Critique of the NYSE's Director
Independence Listing Standards" (2002) 30 Sec Reg LJ 370 at 372 (arguing thatthe NYSE Committee's
proposals that would increase the number of independent directors are not supported by evidence on
director performance); Barry D Baysinger & Henry N Butler, "Corporate Governance and the Board
of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition" (1985) 1:1 JL Econ & Org 101
at 118 (finding there is no linear relationship between performance and board independence, and firms
who tried to increase independence did not improve); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C Coates IV &
Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a
Reply to Symposium Participants" (2002) 55:3 Stan L Rev 885 at 888-899 (arguing that independent
directors do not necessarily "do the right thing" for shareholders in a take-over context); Sanjai Bhagat
& Bernard S Black, "The Uncertain Relationship BetweenBoard Composition and Firm Performance"
(1999) 54:3 Bus Law 921 at 921-932 (explaining there is no evidence that greater board independence
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on the basis of their research, that "there is no convincing evidence that
creates better performance or growth and no empirical evidence firms should have "super-majority
independent board" with only one or two inside directors); Bernard S Black, "Does Corporate
Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data" (2001) 149:6 U Pa L Rev 2131 at 2133-2134
(describing the weak evidence a board's independence has on market value and firm performance);
Rajeswararao S Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan & Subhash Sharma, "Corporate Board Size, Composition
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry" (1985) 22:4 Journal of Management Studies 400 at 414
(finding no relation between the number of outside directors compared with inside directors and
corporate failure in the retail industry); John E Core, Robert W Holthausen & David F Larcker,
"Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance" (1999) 51:3
Journal of Financial Economics 371 at 404 (finding no evidence independent directors create a more
effective board and finding no evidence that greater equity ownership by outside directors creates a
more effective board); James D Cox, "The ALI, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the
Outside Director's Spine" (1993) 61:4 Geo Wash L Rev 1233 at 1239 (explaining that few studies have
found a correlation between board composition and firm performance); Dan R Dalton et al, "MetaAnalytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance" (1998)
19:3 Strategic Management Journal 269 at 282 (reviewing 54 empirical studies and determining there
is "virtually no evidence of a systematic relationship" between board composition and financial
performance); Harold Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance"
(2001) 7:3 Journal of Corporate Finance 209 at 209 (studying the relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance, concluding: "We find no statistically relation between ownership
structure and firm performance."); Robert W Hamilton, "Corporate Governance in America 19502000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits" (2000) 25:2 J Corp L 349 at 371 (finding that recent
changes in corporate governance structures to majority and super-majority independent boards have
resulted in "no detectable increases in shareholder wealth"); Benjamin E Hermalin & Michael S
Weisbacl, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" (1991)
20:4 Financial Management 101 at 111 (finding "no relation between board composition and
performance" and "even if such a relation does exist, it is small, with little economic significance");
April Klein, "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure" (1998) 41:1 JL & Econ 275 at 277
[Klein, "Firm Performance"] (finding little association between firm performance and overall board
composition but finding a positive relation between insiders on finance and investment committees
and stock market performance measures); Laura Lin, "The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a
Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence" (1996) 90:3 Nw UL Rev 898 at 961-967
(concluding that data does not support the notion independent directors can always be relied on as
effective monitors of management, but also finding board independence make a difference in some
monitoring functions); John A Wagner III, J L Stimpert & Edward I Fubara, "Board Composition and
Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects" (1998) 35:5 Journal of
Management Studies 655 at 655 (finding that the greater presence of outside directors improves firm
performance, but so too does the increase of presence of inside directors); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S
Black, "The Board Game," ChiefExecutive Magazine (1 October 1997), online: Chief Executive.net
<http://chiefexecutive.net/the-board-game> ("the proportion of independent directors on a board has
no consistent effect on stock price or accounting based performance"). For more research literature,
see Eric Fogel & Andrew M Geier, "Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Independent Board of Directors" (2007) 32:1 Del J Corp L 33 [Fogel & Geier, "Strangers in the
House"] (confirming previous studies finding no correlation between independent directors and firm
performance and arguing shareholder-owners should be in the majority and independent directors in
the minority); Frederick Tung, "The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning" (2011) 91:3
BUL Rev 1175 (examining firm information environments and the effects on independent directors
efficiency and why previous literature has largely been unable to identify a correlation between
independent directors and firm performance). But also see research indicating independent directors
may add value: Ira M Millstein & Paul W MacAvoy, "The Active Board of Directors and Performance
of the Largely Traded Corporation" (1998) 98:5 Colum L Rev 1283 at 1318 (finding a "substantial and
statistically significant correlation between an active, independent board and superior corporate
performance").
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increasing board independence, relative to the norms that currently prevail
among large American firms, will improve firm performance." 1 In fact,
their evidence suggests companies with super-majorities of independent
directors (ISS recommends a vote in favour of these) actually perform
worse than those with fewer independent directors.8 2 This is not an
idiosyncratic result. One meta-analysis of 54 empirical studies comprising
159 samples and 40,160 observations concluded there was no connection
between board composition and corporate performance. 3
What is true of the board as a whole is true of every part of it as well.
Studies examining the performance of audit committees have found no
relation between committee independence and performance. 4 In fact, the
literature does not even show conclusively that totally independent audit
committees reduce the likelihood of financial statement misconduct.8
As for independent compensation committees, it is worth noting that in
Hollinger's case, the looting of the company by insiders was supervised
by independent directors. Hollinger's corporate report (Form 14A) filed
with the SEC in 2003 mentions three times in four pages that independent
86
directors approved all transactions between Hollinger and insiders.
The problem, of course, is that independence is a purely negative
quality-the absence of a relationship. It tells one nothing about what
skills, experience, talent and effort a director brings to the task. Warren
Buffett once wrote,
Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public company boards
(excluding Berkshire's) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors.
Most of them were "independent" as defined by today's rules. But the
great majority of these directors lacked at least one of the three qualities
I value (business savvy, interested, shareholder-oriented). As a result
their contribution to shareholder well-being was minimal at best and,
too often, negative. These people, decent and intelligent though they
were, simply did not know enough about the business and/or care
enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious
81.
82.

Bhagat & Black, "The Non-Correlation," supra note 80 at 233.
Ibid. See Fogel & Geier, "Strangers in the House," supra note 80 at 52: "Our findings show that

the worst ROE [return on equity] performers in each of fifty industries have approximately the same
percentage of independent directors as the best ROE performers in each industry. No pattern emerges
to suggest that it makes any difference at all to shareholders' financial return whether a board has a
higher or lower percentage of independent directors."
83. Dan R Dalton et al, "Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis" (1999)
42:6 Academy of Management Journal 674.

84.

Romano, "Quack Corporate Governance," supranote 80 at 1530.

85.

Ibid at 1533.

86. See Hollinger International Inc, "Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" US Securities and Exchange Commission (2003), online: SEC
<htp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095013703001865/c75509ddef14a.txt>.
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compensation.8

Independent director-dominated boards fail to correlate in meaningful ways
with positive financial outcomes because independent directors are poorly
suited to provide a contributory role in the company.88 They typically have
very little knowledge of the company's business or markets. They have
no independent sources of information about the company and so depend
almost entirely on the perspective and advice of the CEO.89 They are as
likely to spot new opportunities or hidden challenges to the company as
any other outsider-which is to say, they have very little chance.
A board dominated by its monitoring function actually discourages
management from adopting the transparency and humility necessary for
mentoring and collaborative effort. No one is absolutely candid with a
group whose primary purpose is to criticize. The steps that executives
take to manage the board, usually by controlling the flow of information,
further diminish the ability of the board to make valuable contributions of
advice and expertise to the business.90
None of this means, of course, that independence is irrelevant.
Monitoring is part of what directors are supposed to do, after all. But
independence only goes to one thing, and that is addressing conflicts of
interest, and boards do a great deal of work besides this.

87. Letter from Warren E Buffett (21 February 2003) to Shareholders in Berkshire Hathaway Annual
Report 2002 at 17, online: <http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf>.
88. Ibid at 54 (addressing whether there is a conflict between the expectation for directors to
perform both a monitoring and management function). See also note 80 for a list of empirical studies
suggesting there is no correlation between independent directors improving firm performance. Also
see Klein, "Firm Performance," supra note 80: ("Whereas several papers have demonstrated a link
between effective monitoring and the presence of outsiders on the board for firms experiencing gross
failures of strategy and performance, no paper to date has been able to find an association between
board composition and firm performance on a day-to-day basis.").
89. Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Otto H Swank & Bauke Visser, "In Defense of Boards" (2008) 17:3
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 667; Renee B Adams & Daniel Ferreira, "A Theory
of Friendly Boards" (2007) 62:1 The Journal of Finance 217 [Adams & Ferreira, "Friendly Boards"]
(quality of information directors get from management can be limited because of the monitoring
role independent directors play); Lawrence E Mitchell, "Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance" (2005) 70:4 Brook L Rev 1313 (examining
how outside directors rely almost exclusively on information provided by inside directors and the
consequences of such reliance). Another reason given for the failure of independent directors is lack of
true independence: "Even if a director meets the bright-line test for independence, the enculturation of
the recruitment process, plus social approbation that comes with board service, coupled with the board
room interpersonal dynamics of loyalty and friendship, serve to shear the director of true independence
very quickly." See Fogel & Geier, "Strangers in the House," supra note 80 at 50.
90. Adams & Ferreira, "Friendly Boards," supra note 89 at 218.
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2. Shareholderauthority
Traditionally, Canadian law has tended to favour directors among the
various constituencies surrounding a corporation. 1 Ed Waitzer refers to
the traditional approach in Canada as "the director-centric model."92 The
Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in Peoples and BCE are probably
better understood in light of their impact on the scope ofaction and authority
of the board of directors (greatly increasing both) than by focusing on their
apparent rejection of the shareholder primacy model of the corporation.93

91. Stephane Rousseau, "Directors' Duty of Care After Peoples:Would It Be Wise to Start Worrying
About Liability?" (2004-2005) 41:1 Can Bus U 223 at 223 "Courts were highly deferential when
called upon to review directors decisions." One consequence of this deference is that there have only
been "a handful of cases" in Canada where directors have been sued for breaching their duty of care
(see Bernard S Black & Brian R Cheffins, "Outside Director Liability Across Countries" (2006) 84:6
Tex L Rev 1385 at 1443).
92. Sean Vanderpol & Edward J Waitzer, "Addressing the Tension Between Directors' Duties and
Shareholder Rights-A Tale of Two Regimes" (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 177 at 208.
93. PeoplesDepartment Stores Ltd (Trustee ofJ v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Peoples];
BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE]; the debate between
shareholder/stakeholder primacy models is often cited as beginning with the Berle-Dodd debate:
see Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation, supra note 1 at Chapter VII Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust (shareholder theory) and E Merrick Dodd Jr, "For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?" (1932) 45:7 Harv L Rev 1145 (stakeholder theory). Since then, Milton Friedman advocated
for shareholder theory as the economic basis of all corporate decision making (see Milton Friedman,
"The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits," The New York Times Magazine (13
September 1970): [T]he only "social responsibility ofbusiness is to maximize profits." For more recent
shareholder theory arguments, see Lucian A Bebchuk, "The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power"
(2005) 118:3 Harv L Rev 833; Hansmann & Kraakman, "End of History," supra note 1 (proclaiming
the success of shareholder primacy law in corporate governance). See also the debate between Kent
Greenfield & D Gordon Smith, "Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law?" (2007) 57:4 Emory
U 947 at 965-966 (discussing Professor Greenfield's rejection of shareholder primacy). For articles
evaluating shareholder/stakeholder primacy models, see: Andrew R Keay, "Stakeholder Theory in
Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?" (2010) 9:3 Rich J Global L & Bus 249 (for a history
of stakeholder theory and analysis of its worth). For arguments advocating for stakeholder theories,
see Lynn A Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting ShareholdersFirst Harms Investors,
Corporations,and the Public (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koeler, 2012) [Stout, Shareholder Value
Myth]; Margaret M Blair & LynnA Stout, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) 85:2
Va L Rev 248 (arguing for a variation of stakeholder primacy called team production theory); Lynn
A Stout, "'Inthe Closet," supra note 1 (outlining the pitfalls of shareholder primacy). For stakeholder
theories in the Canadian context, see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "A Team Production Theory of Canadian
Corporate Law" (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 299 (team production theory in the Canadian context); Poonam
Puri & Tuvia Borok, "Employees as Corporate Stakeholders" (2002) 8 J Corporate Citizenship 49;
Poonam Puri, "The Future of Stakeholder Interests" (2009) 48:3 Can Bus U 427 (for an analysis of
stakeholder interests concerning social and environmental responsibility); Allan C Hutchinson, The
Companies We Keep: CorporateGovernancefora DemocraticSociety (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2005)
(arguing against shareholder primacy); Leonard I Rotman, "Debunking the 'End of History' Thesis for
Corporate Law" (2010) 33:2 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 219 ("Canadian corporate law jurisprudence and
the structure of Canadian corporate law statutes reveal the complete lack of support for shareholder
primacy"). See also Stephen Bainbridge for an analysis on director primacy models (Stephen M
Bainbridge, "Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections" (2002) 55:3 Stan L
Rev 791 and Stephen M Bainbridge, "Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment" (2006)
119:6 Harv L Rev 1735).
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Corporations will continue to operate primarily for the benefit of the
shareholders, who have many mechanisms available to them to ensure that
their interests are respected.94 BCE and Peoples gave boards a great deal
more latitude for action, by refusing to require them to tie every decision
to the shareholder interest (whether broadly or narrowly construed).
Whatever innovation this introduced into legal doctrine, it was business as
usual for Canadian courts.95 It is also the traditional approach of American

corporate law.
ISS is generally much less concerned with the authority of boards.
One of the key assumptions found in their Proxy Voting Guidelines is that
"boards of directors should be responsive to the wishes of shareholders as
indicated by majority supported shareholder proposals or lack of majority
support for management proposals including election of directors." 97

94. These include the tremendous influence of share price on executives and directors (Macey,
CorporateGovernance,supra note 72 at 119); the market for corporate control (see Henry G Manne,
"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control" (1965) 73:2 The Journal of Political Economy
110; Eugene F Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: II" (1991) 46:5 The Journal of Finance 1575 for
a discussion of empirical tests of capital market efficiency); and of course voting rights. There is
also significant literature on how the "stakeholder primacy" model conflicts with shareholder votes,
proposals, and interests. See Edward Jacobucci, "Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court's
Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties" (2009) 48:2 Can Bus U 232 (the BCE decision is vague
and devoid of any substantive content on director responsibility); J Anthony Vanduzer, "BCE v 1976
Debentureholders: The Supreme Court's Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law
Decision Since Peoples," Case Comment, (2010) 43 UBC L Rev 205 at 59 (no direction on how
directors are supposed to manage conflicts between shareholders and stakeholders; Peer Zumbansen
& SB Archer, "The BCE Decision: Reflections on the Firm as a Contractual Organization" (2008)
[unpublished, archived as CLPE Research Paper No.17/2008], online: <htp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id-1160094> (considering a relational contract theory in analyzing the conflict
between shareholders and stakeholders and arguing for greater contextual analysis); Edward J Waitzer
& Johnny Jaswal, "Peoples, BCE and the Good Corporate 'Citizen"' (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall U 439
(for the debate on how directors should discharge their responsibilities); Also see the debate between
stakeholder and shareholder primacy models at note 93.
95.

Teck CorporationLimited v Millar, [1973] 2 WWR 385, 33 DLR (3d) 288 (BCSC) [Teck] is

often cited for expanding the interests directors can consider in making decisions. In Peoples,the court
cited Teck and although stating that the directors' duty of care is to the corporation, the court also said
in acting in the "best interests" ofthe corporation, directors may consider other stakeholders, including
creditors. The court also upheld the business judgment rule, where courts will not second-guess
business decisions that were reasonable at the time, even if they prove to be ultimately unsuccessful.
BCE reaffirmed that directors duty is the corporation itself, but directors may take into account
interests of stakeholders: "In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments
and the environment to inform their decisions" at 40. The court also commented on the business
judgment rule: "Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who
take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule. The 'business
judgment rule' accords deference to a business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable
alternatives" at 40.
96. See for example, Bainbridge, "After the Financial Crisis," supra note 29 at 203-233.
97. ISS Guidelines TSX, supra note 64 at 5.
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This translates into concrete voting outcomes in the Proxy Guidelines
in several places. For example, one factor determining whether a
"withhold" recommendation will be issued in connection with a director is
whether he or she has been responsive to shareholder proposals.98 Poison
pills that reserve the decision to sell the company in the hands of directors
are to be rejected.99 Also to be rejected are provisions in by-laws or articles
that either deviate from board processes ISS believes are best or would
diminish the number of things that require shareholder approval."'0 Private
placements are to be approved only if they meet certain ISS (shareholder)
requirements regardless of board support for the financing;"'1 Directorsuggested changes to various pre-existing arrangements are to be rejected
out of hand."0 2
Above all, ISS advocates placing executive compensation in the hands
of the shareholders. In addition to having complex and detailed rules setting
out the boundaries of acceptable executive compensation schemes,0 3 ISS
will recommend negative votes in circumstances where "the board exhibits
poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders." 0 4 This includes
failing to respond to concerns raised in say-on-pay votes, whether or not
the measure passed."15 Mere "significant opposition" can trigger a board
obligation.
ISS generally will support shareholder proposals setting out specific
requirements for compensation schemes, such as requiring options to
vest on performance hurdles.0 6 Failures by a board to adhere to ISS's
compensation guidelines, even with respect to items that don't normally
go to the shareholders, will attract negative recommendations against
directors that approve them. Thus, the terms of employment agreements,

98. Ibid at 8.
99. Ibid at 17.
100. Ibid at 16, 22-23, where the ISS Guidelines recommend to vote against proposals to approve

unlimited capital authorization; generally vote against proposals to create unlimited blank cheque
preferred shares or increase blank cheque preferred shares where the shares cany unspecified rights,
restrictions, and terms or the company does not specify a purpose for the increase; and generally
vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock that will create a class of common
shareholders with diminished voting rights.
101. Ibidat22.
102. Ibid at 24.
103. Ibid at 25-36. See also Institutional Shareholder Services Inc, "2013 Canadian Pay for

Performance Methodology: Frequently Asked Questions" (23 January 2013), online: ISS <http:/
www.issgovernance.com/files/2013CanadianP4PMethodologyFAQ20130123. pdf>.

104. ISS Guidelines TSX, supra note 64 at 25.
105. Ibid at 29.
106. Ibid at 36.

732

The Dalhousie Law Journal

severance agreements and pensions are brought into the ambit of
107
shareholder authority.
The rise of activist shareholders, which, like Jana Partners in Agrium's
case or Pershing Square in CP's case, put corporate strategy and personnel
decisions at the centre of their proxy campaigns also has the effect of
increasing shareholder influence over companies. In 2003 there were six
activist campaigns in Canada; by 2012 it had risen to 42 campaigns.0 8 In
the U.S. there were 27 campaigns in 2000 and more than 200 in 2013.09
This means that proxy advisory firms are increasingly called upon to
evaluate the merits or lack thereof of competing corporate strategies and
personnel decisions. ISS has created a division, based out of New York,
that evaluates the merits of contested elections. As Paul Rose states,
In recent years, the corporate governance rating industry has eroded
directorial and managerial power and enhanced shareholder power.
...It is no coincidence that aggressive, activist investors are affecting
corporate decisions with increasing success in recent years-the rise of
the corporate governance industry has made such activity inevitable.I"
There are two possible rationales for assuming shareholder primacy in
directing the affairs of the corporation. Perhaps shareholders know more
than the directors, or maybe shareholders' interests and incentives are
better aligned with the welfare of the corporation than the directors'. Each
of these will be taken up in turn.
The ISS Guidelines appear to assume that the shareholders (and
ISS) are more likely than the directors to hold correct views on matters
of executive compensation, the approval of new equity issuances, certain
organizational matters and various other topics. Undoubtedly, boards of
directors do occasionally lose their way. But this alone is not sufficient
to justify shareholder primacy. Are shareholders generally better than
107. Ibid at 29.

108. David Pet, "How you can profit from shareholder activism," Financial Post (27 September
2012), online: Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com/2012/09/27/how-you-can-profitfrom-shareholder-activism!>; Katia Dmitrieva & Sean B Pastemack, "Ackman-Like Activism Spurs
Agrium, SNC Rallies," Bloomberg (13 February 2013), online: Bloomberg News <http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-13/ackman-like-activism-spurs-agrium-snc-rallies-corporate-canada.
html>.

109. Martin Lipton, "Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2014" (29 November 2013) (blog),
online: The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation < https:/
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/>. Lipton
points out that in the last seven years one-sixth of S&P 1500 companies have faced activist campaigns
and that 56% of the activist campaigns in 2013, targeted companies whose stock prices outperformed
the market prior to the campaign beginning.
110. Paul Rose, "On The Role and Regulation of Proxy Advisors" (2011) 109 Michigan L Rev First
Impressions 62 at 64-65.
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the directors at identifying what is best for the corporation, at least in
the specific areas covered by the ISS Guidelines (and by any successful
shareholder proposal)?
In considering this question, we must recall that the proxy advisory
industry would not exist if shareholders were generally able and willing
to make informed, intelligent decisions themselves. Collective action
problems, free-riding issues and significant disincentives discourage
shareholders from expending the time and effort needed to thoroughly
inform themselves about the affairs of the firm."'1 This is why corporate
law reposes authority in a much smaller group: the directors. As the court
in the famous U.S. case Smith v. Van Gorkom argued, "Under conditions
of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions,
11 2
authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.
Aproxy advisory firm is doubtless an improvement on the shareholders
in the sense that it has the incentives to devote resources to investigate
companies more thoroughly than some shareholders are capable of, and
others are prepared to, but this often only means a modest increase in
time and resources. Outside of contested elections, there is little evidence
from proxy voting recommendations that there is any understanding of a
company's business, strategy or markets beyond that revealed in a share
price or quick ratio. In the case of contested elections (for instance, as
part of an activist campaign) the advisory firms devote more resources
to investigate the business; the activist and the company will be invited
to make submissions to the proxy advisory firm and an analyst will
examine the question (but not to the extent of even visiting a company's
headquarters).
Compared with the directors, the proxy advisor firm will only ever have
a very superficial understanding of the company. Even after meetings and
correspondence with both sides of the Agrium dispute, for example, ISS
acknowledged that "[t]he most compelling fact about this proxy contest is
not that the distribution business [a central issue was whether this should
111. See discussion at notes 33-34. Also, see Robert C Clark, CorporateLaw (Little, Brown Book
Group Limited, 1986) at 389-400 and Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, "Voting in Corporate
Law" (1983) 26:2 JL & Econ 395 (discussing collective action problems); Evaristus Oshionebo,
"Shareholder Proposals and the Passivity of Shareholders in Canada: Electronic Forums to the
Rescue?" (2012) 37:2 Queen's LJ 623 (for an analysis on shareholder passivity related to the difficulties
in submitting proposals); Bernard S Black, "Shareholder Passivity Reexamined" (1990) 89 Mich L
Rev 520 at 567; Black, "Shareholder Activism," supra note 36; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny,
"A Survey of Corporate Governance" (1997) 52:2 The Journal of Finance 737; Sanford J Grossman
& Oliver D Hart, "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation' (1980)
11:1 The Bell Journal of Economics 42 (free-riding makes it cost ineffective for small shareholders to
monitor management).
112. Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 3 EXC 112 (Del. 1985) at para 69.
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be sold or kept] is well run or poorly run, but that shareholders still cannot
' In fact, ISS could not answer
answer this question for themselves."113
the
question themselves-that's why they punted and recommended a hybrid
board.114
The board of directors of a corporation usually has a long, deep
association with the business. They have a sense of corporate history and
culture, the strengths and weaknesses of the executives, and the nature of
the company's markets, that shareholders and proxy advisory firms cannot
replicate. We see this in areas where shareholder managerial competence
can be measured. Examinations of hedge fund activism, for example,
have found gains only in the subset of companies that are subsequently
acquired; no gains appear where only the management of the company is
affected.115 Another empirical study of the same phenomena concluded,
"only a minority of the targets' stock prices beat market indices over the
period of engagement, with financial underperformance being particularly
'
notable in cases where the hedge fund entered the target boardroom." 116
When it comes to shareholder proposals, a recent study in the U.S.
found no evidence these proposals resulted in either long-term or shortterm improvements in corporate value.117 Of the 1,164 activist campaigns
between 2000 and 2007 examined in one U.S. study, over 70% were
rejected by the shareholders as presumably not in the interests of the
company.118 Indeed, Romano points out that

"[i]t is quite probable that private benefits accrue to some investors
from sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. The disparity
in identity of sponsors-the predominance of public and union funds
[making proposals], which, in contrast to private sector funds, are not
in competition for investor dollars-is strongly suggestive of their
presence."" 9

113. "ISS Proxy Paper," supra note 51 at 30.
114. Ibid.

115. Robin Greenwood, "The Hedge Fund as Activist" (22 August 2007) (newsletter), online:
Harvard Business School Working Knowledge <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5743.html>.
116. William R Bratton, "Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Results," University of
Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-17, September 2010, online:
Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1677517>.
117. Joao Dos Santos & Chen Song, "Analysis of the Wealth Effects of Shareholder Proposals" (22
July 2008) U.S. Chamber of Commerce Research Paper, online: Center For Capital Markets <http:/
www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-contentl/uploads/2010/04/080722wfi shareholder.pdf>.
118. Nickolay M Gantchev, "The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model" (2013) 107:3 Journal of Financial Economics 610.
119. Romano, "Less is More," supranote 37 at 231. See also Bainbridge, "After the Financial Crisis,"
supra note 29 at 247 for a series of high-profile examples of attempts by the manager of an institutional
shareholder to use the proposal process for private purposes.
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The prevalence of private benefits being sought by shareholders in
these cases explains why these shareholders deviate from the "rational
apathy" that generally characterizes the shareholder engagement with

corporate governance."'
In relation to its policy that shareholder proposals passed at a meeting
should be enacted, or the board removed, ISS received submissions from
many of the largest corporations in the U.S., as well as the Business
Roundtable and the National Association of Corporate Directors, all

making the argument that "[b]oards would be coerced to abdicate their
fiduciary duties, which do not disappear or become less significant when
a majority of votes cast at a meeting support a particular proposal. Boards
should not feel compelled to act where they believe such action is not in

the best interests of the company." ' ISS nevertheless adopted the rule-a
decision that can only be explained by their abiding belief that shareholders
(and ISS) are, in some sense, perfectly qualified to manage wide aspects of
a company's business.
The second assumption accounting for the privileging of shareholders
over directors is ISS's apparent belief that the interests of the shareholders
are better aligned with those of the company. While corporate law has
attempted to address agency costs (in the form of conflicts and shirking)
by imposing legal duties on the directors, shareholders have no such
duties. Indeed, shareholders are deliberately left free to transact in the
corporation's shares with a view only to their own profit. Canada has never
gone so far as the United States and imposed fiduciary duties even on
majority shareholders 122
120. See discussion at notes 29-39.
121. Letter from Matthew Lepore, Vice President and Corporate Secretary, Chief Counsel, Pfizer Inc.
(7 November 2012), online: ISS <http://www.issgovemance.com/files/Pfizerlnc..pdf>; See Larcker,
McCall & Tayan, "And Then A Miracle Happens!," supra note 69.
122. The strongly majoritarian focus of English and early Canadian corporation law is described in
Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860-1987" (1989) 27:3
Osgoode Hall LJ 561. This majoritarian attitude is aptly evidenced by Fossv Harbottle (1843), 2 Hare
461, 67 ER 189 (VC Ct), where the court held that it was the decision of the majority shareholders
on whether to take action for a wrong done to the company, indicating the decisions of majority
shareholders are absolute. Despite early decisions, there were a few judicial holdings indicating there
was some sort offiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders, at least in terms of anti-discrimination
against a minority shareholder (seeAllen v GoldReefs ofWestAfrica Ltd, [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA)). The
closest Canada's courts came to imposing this sort of duty was GoldexMines Ltdv Revill (1974), 7 OR
(2d) 216 at 223-224, 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA) where the court held the "majority must act fairly and
honestly," but did not actually decide that majority shareholders owed a duty to minority shareholders.
These attempts were firmly rejected in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Brant Investments Ltd
v KeepRight Inc (1991), 3 OR (3d) 289, 80 DLR (4th) 161 (CA) where the court held that Canadian
law has never actually imposed a fiduciary duty on majority shareholders. Nonetheless, shareholders
do have an action under the oppression remedy, which some commentators are referring to as a "quasifiduciary duty." See Poonam Puri et al,Cases, Materials and Notes on Partnershipsand Canadian
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The ways in which the interests of short-term shareholders vary
from those of most other corporate constituencies is obvious. Earnings
manipulation, misleading public disclosure, short-term and high-risk
business strategies, can all help short-term holders of shares make
profits.123 If, for example, the market is not giving value to a company's
R&D investment, then it should be ended, regardless of the long-term
consequences to the company's business.124 The money would be better
spent in a stock buy-back programme.125
Long-term shareholders, on the other hand, are often held up as the
group whose interests are reliably aligned with those of the company.126
However, as Jesse Fried points out, long-term shareholders' interests are
only aligned with the long-term growth of the company when that company
neither issues nor repurchases its shares.127 In the case of repurchases, longterm shareholders will benefit if management diverts funds from valuable
projects to buy back shares at a moment that they are undervalued, or if
management engages in price-manipulation around repurchases. In each
of these cases, while the economic interests of the corporation are harmed,
Business Corporations,5thed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), Chapter 7 "Regulating the Exercise ofPower
by Controlling Shareholders." See also Jeffrey G Macintosh, Janet Holmes & Steven Thompson, "The
Puzzle of Shareholder Fiduciay Duties" (1991) 19:1 Can Bus LJ 86 where the authors suggest reasons

why Canada has never imposed a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders, unlike the US.
123. Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia & Marc Lipson, "Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence
From Financial Misreporting" (2010) 16:4 Journal of Corporate Finance 443 at 444 (finding shortterm investors are positively correlated with increases in the likelihood and severity of accounting
restatements). See also "Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to
Investment and Business Management" (9 September 2009) at 2, online: The Aspen Institute <http:/
www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approachinvestment-business-management>; see also Martin Lipton & Steven A Rosenblum, "Election
Contests in the Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come" (2003) 59:1 Bus Law 67
(deriding the influence of short-term shareholders) and Lynne Dallas, "Short-Termism, the Financial
Crisis, and Corporate Governance" (2011) 37:1 J Corp L 264 (the impacts of short-termism on the
recent financial crisis). Lynn Stout also write on the problems of short-termism (see Stout, Shareholder
Value Myth, supra note 93 at chapter 5. See also Kay, "The Kay Review," supra note 23.
124. Brian J Bushee, "The Influence of Institutional Investors onMyopic R&D Investment Behaviour"
(1998) 73:3 The Accounting Review 305 at 307. (Companies with more short-term shareholders are
more likely to cut R&D expenses to make short-term targets.)
125. Justin Fox & Jay W Lorsch, "What Good Are Shareholders?" (2012) 90:7-8 Harv Business Rev
49, at 50: "Corporations do need capital to invest in growth, but they don't get it in aggregate from
shareholders. Net issuance of corporate equity in the U.S. over the past decade has been negative $287
billion, according to the Federal Reserve. That negative number would be much bigger if we left out
financial institutions and their desperate fundraising in 2008 and 2009. Factor in dividend payments,
and we find a multi-trillion dollar transfer of cash from U.S. corporations to their shareholders over the
past 10 years."
126. Jesse M Fried, "The Uneasy Case For Favoring Long-Term Shareholders" (18 March 2013)
European Corporate Governance Institute, ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 200, online: Social Science
Research Network <http://papers.ssracom/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-2227080# / 23> [Fried,
"Uneasy"].
127. Ibid.
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the long-term shareholders prosper at the expense of those short-term
shareholders selling into the company's repurchasing programme.
Fried goes on to point out that in the case of a company issuing shares,
anything that inflates the value of the shares being sold to new investors
benefits the long-term shareholders by reducing their dilution. Indeed,
for a company about to conduct a financing or acquisition, the long-term
shareholder is in much the same position as a short-term shareholder.
Earnings manipulation or high-risk and short-term business strategies all
reduce their dilution and can leave them better off at the expense of the new
investors, even after the damage to the company is realized.128 These are
not abstract concerns. Fried cites research that, "over the last 40 years an
aggregate of over $2.2 trillion has been transferred to long-term investors
through bargain repurchases and inflated-price equity issuances. '"29
Both long- and short-term shareholders, if they are diversified, also
have incentives to encourage undue risk-taking by a company. Some
corporate failures in an investment portfolio will be offset by gains realized
by companies whose gambles pay off."13 Thus, what is best for a portfolio
13 1
of companies may not be what is best for any one company in particular.
Directors must steer a middle path between shareholders' appetite for risk
and creditors' risk aversion.
Many long-term shareholders are funds managed by professional
advisors, whose personal interests diverge markedly from those of the
company and the funds' unitholders. Money managers are rewarded based
on their relative performance, not their absolute returns.132 If a fund owns a
risk-averse company that is being outperformed by its peers, the manager
is incentivized to demand the company management replicate the risky
strategy, even if it significantly increases the risk of corporate failure. If
the risky strategy does fail, at least the decline in the money manager's
portfolio will be in line with those of his or her peers. Lawrence Mitchell
argues,

128. Ibid at 48: "One study found that firms with large blockholders (which are more likely to be
long-term shareholders) are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation around equity offerings
than firms without such blockholders."
129. Ibid at 7.
130. Equityholders are incentivized to seek risk as they receive all the upside of successful gambles
but share the downside with corporate creditors (see Jensen & Meckling, "Theory of the Firm," supra
note 1).
131. See, for example, Roger L Martin, Fixing the Game: Bubbles, Crashes, and What Capitalism
Can Learn from the NFL (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business Review Press, 2011) at 1-42 [Martin,
"Fixing the Game"].
132. See notes at 22-24 for a discussion on how money managers are compensated and rewarded.
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Managers thrive by increasing their portfolio's value. That is a hard thing
to do and it takes time. So for years fund managers have increased their
pay by putting pressure on corporate managers to increase short-term
stock prices at the expense of long-term business health... For example,
managers responded to the pressure by using their retained earnings to
engage in large stock buybacks. In the three years leading up to September
2007, companies in the S&P 500 used more money to buy back stock
than invest in production. With retained earnings gone, all that was left
to finance production was debt. When the credit markets collapsed, these
corporations could not borrow, and thus could not produce.'33
Professional money managers are often subject to other incentives as well.
In rejecting the SEC proxy access rules in 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia observed,
there is good reason to believe institutional investors with special
interests will be able to use the mle.. Nonetheless, the [SEC] failed
to respond to comments arguing that investors with a special interest,
such as unions and state and local governments whose interests in jobs
may well be greater than their interest in share value, can be expected
to pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal of maximizing
shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to incur costs even
when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.'34
It is hard to see why, in principle, ISS assumes shareholders (and
the professionals that manage many of them) are better stewards of
the corporation than the directors. They may be in certain individual
cases, just as the directors may be wrong about strategy or personnel in
certain individual cases, but in general it is not true. Nevertheless, the
assumed superiority of shareholders underlies many of ISS' proxy voting
recommendations.
3. Governance by formal rules
Many provisions in the ISS Voting Guidelines indicate that a voting
recommendation will be issued on a case-by-case basis. This might
suggest that ISS conducts nuanced, contextual evaluations of the board's
activities, but almost invariably, the reference to case-by-case voting is
followed by specific criteria that will actually determine the vote. So, for
example, a recommendation to support a director nominee of a majority
shareholder will be made on a case-by-case basis, but only if each of

133. Lawrence Mitchell, "Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators," Financial Times (8 July

2009), online: Financial Times Comment Opinion subsection <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/facgglb66be5-1lde-9320-00144feabdcO.html - axzz2teOeK3ZX>.
134. Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v Securities
and Exchange Commission, 647 F.3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011).
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six conditions are met and satisfactory conclusions drawn from three
additional requirements.135

For this reason, most issuers believe that proxy advisory firms produce
one-size-fits-all or "check the box" corporate governance rules.136 This
is particularly concerning in a country like Canada, where every level
and type of regulator in the securities arena has consciously refrained
from imposing strict governance rules. Looking at pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
initiatives, the Saucier Committee observed, "some of the U.S. approaches
appear to us to be excessively rules-based and not in keeping with the way
in which governance practices have evolved in Canada over the recent
past. "137

Several years later, following the controversial adoption of a
mandatory regime in the U.S. as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, there
was significant debate in Canada about whether to follow suit. 138 Canadian
regulators ultimately decided to avoid most of the rules-based approach
of Sarbanes-Oxley. Indeed, the regulators even chose to avoid endorsing
specific principles as recommended or superior forms of corporate
governance. Instead, they require issuers "to disclose their corporate
governance practices with reference to specified disclosure items, without
suggesting or implying an ideal or preferred practice. 139
While a board of directors can customize its governance practices to
take into account a myriad of circumstances and personalities, this approach
is not open to proxy advisory firms. In Canada, there are approximately
3,800 public companies and 84% of those companies on the TSX have

135. "ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 9.
136. See for example, Power Corporation of Canada, Letter to CSA, 19 September 2012 at 8:
"[T]here are legitimate governance differences for controlled companies like Power Corporation and
our controlled public company subsidiaries. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach is clearly inappropriate.";
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited, Letter to CSA (20 August 2012) at 2: "We, like many other public
companies in Canada and the United States, are concerned that the summary output of proxy advisory
firms can be-and in the past has been-inaccurate or incomplete and often reflects a 'one size fits all'
or doctrinaire approach."; and Gildan Inc, Letter to CSA (21 September 2012) at 10: "A related issue is
the 'one size fits all' approach of PA [proxy advisory] Firms, which results in cookie-cutter guidelines
that do not address the nuances of certain types of issuers."
137. "Saucier Committee Report," supra note 2 at 27. See also Kerry Shannon Burke, "Regulating
Corporate Governance Through the Market: Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada
and the United Kingdom" (2001-2002) 27:3 J Corp L 341. Burke points out that the UK and Canada
have reasons for refusing to follow United States-style corporate governance rules. In the case of the
UK there are statutory preemptive rights that give the shareholders control over management; Canada
has the oppression remedy. See also Sanjai Bhagat, Brian J Bolton & Roberta Romano, "The Promise
and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices" (2008) 108:8 Colum L Rev 1803. Bhagat, Bolton &
Romano point out that Sarbanes-Oxley style governance rules are alien even to the US tradition.
138. Sibold, "Assessing Canada's Regulatory Response," supra note 2 at 783-791.
139. Ibidat 791.
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year-ends of December 3 1.1"o In nearly all cases this means their AGMs are
scheduled to occur within a three-month period between mid-March and
mid-June, known to securities professionals as "proxy season." For 80%
of TSX-listed companies there are less than 50 days between receipt of
the proxy materials and the meeting.141 In other words, the proxy advisory
firms must generate thousands of voting recommendations during a very
short time period. It would simply be impossible for this to consist of more
than a check-the-box exercise.142
No one defends check-the-box corporate governance. Not even the
proxy advisors have good things to say about what ISS deprecates as
one-size-fits-all approaches. 1 3 For several reasons, flexibility has been a
priority in Canada's traditional approach to corporate governance. For one
thing, there is little agreement about what actually constitutes the end of
good corporate governance. ISS offers different proxy recommendations
to union pension funds, public pension funds and socially responsible
investors, because those investors are interested in different outcomes
(including, for example, reducing income inequality or avoiding certain
kinds of polluting activities) than other investors.1 ' Even the touchstone
of shareholder value obscures conflicts between the interests of shortterm and long-term shareholders, and the conflicts between both types of
shareholder and the corporation itself.1.5

Box-checking approaches to corporate governance likely encourage
boards to focus on mere mechanical compliance rather than on what the
company actually needs." 6 The spirit of conscientious stewardship over
the firm disappears in a process conducted with one eye on whether the
outcome will conform to the proxy advisors' rules.
140. Professor YvanAllaire, "The Troubling Case ofProxy Advisors: Some Policy Recommendations"
(January 2013) Policy Paper No. 7 at 15, online: Institute for Governance of Private and Public
Organizations
(IGOPP)
<http://www.igopp.org/IMG/pdf/pp troublingcaseproxyadvisors-pp7
short 3 .pdf>.
141. Ibid.

142. Issues that arise in connection with generating these recommendations in a very short period of
time are discussed in x, "Proxy Advisory Firms," supra note 10.
143. Debra L Sisti & Martha Carter, "Re: Consultation Paper 25-401: Potential Regulation of Proxy

Advisory Firms" (10 August 2012), ISS letter to Canadian Securities Administrators consultation
paper 25-401 at 15, online: Ontario Securities Commission <https://www.osc.gov.oaca/documents/
en/Securities-Category2-Comments/com 20120810 25-401 sistid carterm.pdf> [Sisti & Carter,
"ISS letter"].
144. Stephen J Choi, Jill E Fisch & Marcel Kahan, "The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?"
(2010) 59:4 Emory LJ 869 at 883 [Choi, Fisch& Kahan, "Power of Proxy Advisors"]. Sisti & Carter,
"ISS letter," supranote 143 at 6, indicates it manages over 400 custom policies for investors in Canada
alone.
145. See discussion at notes 124, 131.
146. Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, "Corporate Governance in the UK:
Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?" (2010) 30 Int'l Rev L & Econ 193 at 193.
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Even in circumstances where there is widespread agreement about the
most desirable outcomes, multiple institutional arrangements can achieve
them. One study of the influence of different governance arrangements
on controlling excessive executive compensation found that shareholder
activism, a CEO/Chair split, an independent board, and an independent
compensation committee all tended to substitute for one another.147 It is
not necessarily the case that good corporate governance requires all of
them simultaneously (although ISS's rules make this assumption). A
strongly independent board can offset a compensation committee with a
non-independent member, for example.
Finally, corporate governance ultimately concerns the management
of people, particularly senior executives. There are significant differences
between executives, not just in terms of temperament and career
objectives, but in their risk tolerance, discount rates and wealth portfolio
diversification. 148 These individual differences in turn produce unique
dynamics within a management team and the board of directors. No one
would argue that just one set of institutional arrangements is optimized for
every one of the infinitely variated communities which make up a modem
business corporation. But that is what the rules-based approach of the
proxy advisory firms assumes.
A good example of the dysfunctional ways the proxy advisors' rules
interact with a recalcitrant real world is afforded in the area of executive
compensation. This is a particularly useful example as it is one area where
there is near universal agreement about the ends of corporate governance:
restraining excessive executive compensation. It is also very much a
growth area for the proxy advisory firms as say-on-pay votes become
more common.1 49 Even before the current activism around executive pay
began, 50 nearly 60% of US public companies referred to proxy advisors'
policies when designing an executive compensation plan. 51
147. Chowdhury & Wang, "Institutional Activism Types," supranote 26 at 30.

148. See for example the research cited ibid at 13.
149. For current Canadian practices, see Nicholas Van Praet, "Canada Out of Step on Say on Pay,"
FinancialPost (15 April 2013), online: <htp://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/15/saypay/>; Say
on pay was made mandatory in the U.S. under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
ProtectionAct, Pub L No 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat 1375 and in the UK under the CompaniesAct 2006
(UK), c 46, s 439.

150. "2013 Canadian Say on Pay Results," (3 July 2013) Issue 2013-5 at 1, online: Meridian
Compensation Partners <htp://www.meridiancp.com/images/uploads/TNU-2013-5 July 2013 Say
on Pay Outcomes.pdf>: "Three companies failed to receive majority support [in 2013 for Say on
Pay]: Barrick Gold, Equal Energy and Golden Star Resource. [In 2012], only one company (QLT Inc)
failed to receive majority support."
151. David F Larcker, Allan L McCall & Brian Tayan, "The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting
Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation Decisions, Director Notes, The
Conference Board," (March 2012), online: Conference Board of Canada <htp://www.conference-
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The rules found in ISS's Proxy Guidelines relating to executive
pay are extremely complex and are supplemented by an additional 21page FAQ to assist companies in understanding how ISS generates its
recommendations in this area. 152 The touchstone for ISS is the relationship
executive compensation in a company bears to its Total Shareholder Return
performance over the short (one-year) and medium (three-year) term.153
This is, itself, a controversial choice, since it ties executive compensation
in most companies to one factor: share price. (Dividends are included in
total shareholder return, but they are either not paid or are swamped by
share price fluctuations in most Canadian companies. 154)
Many corporate governance experts, however, believe there are
significant problems with tying executive compensation to share price.
Roger Martin argues that because stock prices factor in the market's
expectations for the future, to constantly increase a company's share
price means its management must continually improve not its growth,
but its growth rate.155 Obviously over time this becomes mathematically
impossible. Focusing executives on managing the market's expectations
about the company also transfers their attention from something they can
affect (the actual financial performance of the company) to something they
can barely influence (the fluctuations of the market). Martin argues that the
repeated corporate frauds overthe past fifteen years, along with the reckless
over-leveraging that preceded the 2008 crisis, are the logical result of
tying executives' compensation to the share price. When corporate officers
cannot improve upon market expectations naturally, they are tempted to
resort to earnings manipulation or higher-risk strategies to boost growth.
The Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations,
located in Montreal, issued a policy paper in 2012, which recommended:
Compensation should be linked to quantitative and qualitative indicators
which drive the economic performance of the company, which measure
the long-term value of the company; every company is somewhat
different in this respect and cookie-cutter programs will not do the job;
quantitative indicators should not be stock-price related but of the sort
board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename-TCB-DN-V4N5 -12.pdf&type-sub site>.
152. ISS, 2013 Canadian Pay for Performance Methodology: Frequently Asked Questions (23 January
2013), online: <http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013CanadianP4PMethodologyFAQ20130123.
pdf>.
153. "ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 26-27.
154. According to the Canadian DRIP & SPP List (online: <http://www.dripprimer.ca/
canadiandriplist>), which purports to include all Canadian companies that pay dividends,
approximately 120 companies and 50 REITs paid dividends out of the 1,517 issuers listed on the TSX
and 2,344 issuers listed on the TSX-V (see TMX Group, "Equity Financing Statistics-January 2015,"
online: <http://www.tmx.com/resource/en/422>.
155. Martin, "Fixing the Game," supra note 131.
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that do measure the long-term health of the company, such as Return on
Invested Capital (ROIC) and Economic Value Added (EVA); they should
not be highly volatile and easily manipulated; qualitative performance
should be linked to the more subtle character of an organization, its
ethics, the sense of belonging and fairness felt by most members of the
organization.' 56
The point is not that ISS's focus on share price is necessarily wrong
(although I suspect it is), it is that reasonable men and women, equally
sophisticated about corporate governance matters, can disagree on this
point. And yet this is the assumption that fundamentally generates ISS's
voting recommendations.
The ISS recommendations also, of course, fail to capture the
features of executive compensation that are the idiosyncratic outcomes
of the personality of the executive (how risk adverse, how wealthy),
the circumstances of the company (how dire), the alternatives available
to the executive (a pleasant retirement, a more prestigious or higher
paying job), the alternatives to the company (a less experienced, capable,
popular replacement) or the priorities of the board (to sell the company,
improve morale, innovate or build a new business). Anyone who has
negotiated a compensation package with an incoming senior executive
knows that these factors drive compensation decisions as much (and
often more) than the company's recent performance relative to its peers.
Obviously, however, proxy advisory firms have too little time and too little
information to incorporate these sorts of nuanced considerations into their
recommendations.
Empirical research performed on proxy advisory firms' executive
pay policies holds few surprises. The most recent study looked at 2,008
firms in the Russell 3000 Index that held their shareholder meetings in
2011 and were required by the Dodd-Frank Act to have a shareholder
say-on-pay vote on executive compensation, many of them for the first
time. 15 7 A large number of these companies announced alterations to their
executive compensation schemes in the eight months preceding their
shareholder meeting and many of these changes sought to better align the
firms' executive compensation with published proxy advisor guidelines.

156. Yvan Allaire, "Pay for Value: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Executive Compensation," (March
2012), online: Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations at 54 <http://igopp.org/
1MG/pdf/pppayforvalue allaire en v4.pdf>.
157. David F Larcker, Allan L McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, "Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to
Proxy Advisory Firms" (10 May 2013), Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research
Paper No. 2105, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrnicom/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id-2101453>
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The researchers found that stock market reaction to these compensation
changes was statistically negative. "[The] policies of proxy advisory
firms... induce boards of directors to make compensation decisions that
decrease shareholder value." 5 8
Other research has found that proxy advisory voting recommendations
for stock option exchanges and re-pricing also decreases shareholder
value.159 Indeed, "future operating performance is lower and executive
turnover is higher when the exchange program is constrained in the manner
recommended by ISS. '" 6 A measure of the power of proxy advisors is
that the patterns of insider trading activity during the months prior to the
new plans' adoption suggest that insiders expect the new plan to be value
destroying."o' Yet the advisor-approved plans are adopted regardless. As
another paper summarizes the situation: "there is no research evidence to
support ISS criteria for equity compensation plans orthe firm's calculation
of proprietary metrics.., which are used to determine whether shareholder
dilution is excessive.162

4. Standardsetting andpenalties
The Voting Guidelines published by proxy firms serve a dual purpose: to
provide prior warning to issuers of the kinds of actions that will attract
critical vote recommendations (this is a matter of fairness), and to guide
the corporate governance practices of Canadian issuers (this is a matter
of setting standards). As one supporter of the proxy advisors commented,
"to the extent that issuers are changing their practices to conform to the
policies of proxy advisors and those policies reflect the principles of
good governance supported by institutional investors, then it is a positive
development that will lead to improved governance in Canadian public
companies." 161

158. Ibidat 45.
159. David F Larcker, Allan L McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, "Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock
Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services" (15 April 2011), online: Stanford
University Graduate School of Business <https:Hgsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/
RP2077&100.pdf> [Larcker, McCall & Ormazabal, "Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option
Exchanges"].
160. David F Larcker & Brian Tayan, "Do ISS Voting Recommendations Create Shareholder Value?"
(19 April 2011) Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Standford Univesity Closer Look Series:
Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-13 at 2, online: Social Science
Research Network <http://papers. ssracom/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id- 1816543>.
161. Larcker, McCall & Ormazabal, "Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges," supra
note 159 at 160.

162. Larcker, McCall & Tayan, "ThenAMiracle Happens!," supra note 69 at 4.
163. Daniel E Chornous, "Re: CSA Consultation Paper 25-401: Potential Regulation of Proxy
Advisory Firms" (19 September 2012) at 6, online: Canadian Coalition for Good Governance <http:/
www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/submission re csa consultationjpaper 25-401signed-.pdf>.
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The Voting Guidelines have the kind of mandatory language one
would expect from a document intended to establish standards of behavior.
A violation of one of these standards results in a penalty, in this case an
adverse vote recommendation. Unfortunately advisory firms have only
this one, crude, penalty at their disposal. The tool is made even blunter
by the very limited number of matters voted on by shareholders, and by
the inherent mismatch between the complex matters often put before the
shareholders and the simplistic yes or no alternatives provided to the
shareholders at the meeting.
This leads to strange results throughout the Voting Guidelines. For
example, the Voting Guidelines provide that violations of recommended
practices for executive compensation may result in recommendations
16 4
against the re-election of members of the compensation committee. But
while the compensation committee investigates the details of compensation
and negotiating with senior management, the board as a whole makes the
ultimate decision on compensation. Indeed, under Canadian corporate law,
the board cannot delegate equity-based compensation to a committee (very
often this is the largest component of remuneration paid to executives by
value).165
One experienced Canadian director pointed out the operation of
this rule is "intimidation bordering on extortion," that it is "unfair" and
"highly detrimental to recruiting appropriate members to compensation
committees." '66 Why have proxy firms decided to focus this penalty on
the members of the compensation committee? First, there is no alternative
penalty available to the advisors-only a "withhold" recommendation with
its attendant reputational and professional consequences. This can be (and
apparently is) experienced as extortion, but in fairness to the proxy firms,
there is no other way for them to engage with the company. It might make
more sense to be reorganize the compensation committee, commission
a third party to study the issuer's compensation practices, terminate an
offending officer, or get rid of a particular unknown director who advocated
for the offending practice. But proxy advisors don't have these alternatives
available to them. Secondly, outside of the most egregious violations of
remuneration best practices, it does not make sense to replace the entire
board. Many, maybe even most, violations of the remuneration rules in the
Voting Guidelines are technical or otherwise non-material. Focusing the
164. "ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 25.
165. See CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 115(3)(c).

166. Douglas Reeson, "Re: Comments on CSA Consultation Paper 25-401-Proxy Advisory
Services" (7 January 2013) at 2, online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
documents/en/Securities-Category2-Comments/com 20130107 25-401 reesond.pdf>.
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penalties on the members of the compensation committee actually reflects
the most proportionate approach to the problem, given proxy advisors'
limited tools. The policy's unfairness and logical inconsistencies are an
unavoidable side effect.
The Voting Guidelines prescribe a number of rules for certain types of
transactions. Failure to adhere to one of the rules results in a vote against
the transaction regardless of its overall merits. For example, failure to
adhere to any one of the eighteen requirements of a shareholder rights
plan, including some remarkably general ones (e.g., the plan contains
"unacceptable key definitions"167 ), will result in a recommendation to
vote against the plan as a whole, ignoring whether, in substance, the plan
would effectively serve to maximize shareholder value by facilitating an
auction.168
Interviews with issuers and legal counsel turn up story after story
of major, complex transactions imperiled by proxy advisors because of
immaterial violations of the Voting Guidelines. A stock option plan needed
by a company in financial distress and in the process of restructuring
its senior management team was rejected because it did not contain a
provision forbidding an action banned by the TSX in any event.169 A trust
conversion almost failed to occur by the deadline set by the government
because the proposed corporate entity included a class of preferred shares
issuable in series (a relatively common-and benign-feature of Alberta
Business CorporationsAct-incorporated companies).l1°
The disproportionate response of the proxy advisory firms to minor
deviations from their rules might seem like the work of an unreasonable
analyst, but it is built into the Voting Guidelines. The only way a proxy
advisor can enforce the house rules is by being willing to burn down the
house. The crude penalties found in the Voting Guidelines (and there are
no others available) thus generate perverse outcomes: the advisors as
167. "ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 17.

168. See the evidence that even "dead hand" poison pills assist company shareholders get better
valuations on take-overs: Katherine Gleason and Mark Klock, "Is There Power Behind the Dead
Hand? An Empirical Investigation of Dead Hand Poison Pills" (23 May 2008) Penn State Legal

Research Paper No. 02-2008; Corporate Control, Vol 6, online: Social Science Research Network
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id- 1136784>. See also, John Coates, "Takeover
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence," (2000) 79:2 Texas L Rev

271, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id-263632>.

169. Personal experience of the author. See also Carol Hansell, "CSA Consultation Paper 25-401
at 5," (20 June 2012), online: Ontario Security Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/
en/Securities-Category2-Comments/com 20120920 25-401 hansellc.pdf>. Davies, CSA Response
Letter (20 September 2013) at 5.
170. "ISS Guidelines TSX," supra note 64 at 23. Interview of General Counsel, Canadian Oil Sands
by Bryce C Tingle (17 May 2013).
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tribune for the shareholders routinely recommend actions that run directly
contrary to those shareholders' best interests.
Conclusion
There is no shortage of recommendations as to how to fix the market for
third-party proxy advice. Securities law in Canada has traditionally used
two principal regulatory approaches to problems in its public markets:
banning a practice, or requiring additional disclosure. While variations of
both approaches have been suggested in relation to proxy advisory firms,
one difficulty with the former is that issuers, advisory firms and institutional
shareholders are the most sophisticated actors in the capital markets, and
banning a practice which affects only them (and which market success
suggests is useful) runs contrary to the logic of securities regulation.
Blackrock Inc., one of the largest institutional investors in the world,
wrote a letter to the CSA in response to its request for comment on proxy
advisors. 171 In general, Blackrock supported the industry. It pointed out
that it submits votes at approximately 15,000 shareholder meetings in
over 90 countries each year. It employs only 20 corporate governance
professionals.
The bulk of these votes occur in the second quarter of the year. The
increasingly global focus of investors adds additional demands on the
resources allocated to proxy voting analysis. Meeting materials are often
available only in the company's local language.... Cross-border voting
introduces a further layer of complexity in the forn of market-specific
restrictions, burdensome administrative requirements, and narrow
disclosure windows, to name a few.' 2
There is no real alternative to third-party proxy advisors-not if we expect
institutional shareholders to vote at all. We might encourage optimal
governance outcomes by permitting each institutional shareholder to
decide whether it will vote on a particular matter, rather than requiring
them all to vote, regardless of the inclination, expertise and effort they put
into a particular voting decision.173 Indeed, while it is outside the scope of
this paper, the very existence of the proxy industry suggests a generation
of corporate governance activists has been wrong: more institutional

171. Robert E Zivnuska, "Re: Canadian Securities Administrators Consultation Paper 25-401:
Potential Regulation of Proxy Advisory Firms" (20 September 2012), Blackrock Inc comment letter
to Canadian Securities Administrators consultation paper, online: Ontario Securities Commission
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category2-Comments/com

zivnuskar.pdf>.
172. Ibid at 1-2.
173. See note 32.

20120920 25-401
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involvement is probably not the solution to improving the management of
174
Canada's businesses.
But even if we accept the current norms and legal duties around
institutional shareholder voting, there is at least one regulatory intervention
that would reduce the problems discussed in this paper: let companies
directly address the recommendations made by proxy advisors. Give them
advance notice of proxy firm recommendations. Permit them to make their
case to the proxy firm analysts, or at least to the fund manager clients of
the proxy firms. Such changes should improve the quality of disclosure
and by doing so improve the quality of the proxy advice. This familiar
formula has underlain many changes to the shareholder voting regime in
this country over the past thirty years. It is not radical to think it might
work in the case at hand.
The directors of every Canadian issuer should have an opportunity
to review and comment on any voting advice widely disseminated by
third parties. (Currently ISS only allows companies that form part of the
TSX/S&P Composite Index to review proxy recommendations for factual
accuracy only. Glass Lewis does not show its work to anyone prior to its
publication.)
If an issuer disagrees with a recommendation, the directors should
be permitted to outline the reasons for the board's disagreement in the
voting recommendation document circulated by the proxy advisory
firm to investors. This would permit the issuer to explain why the
recommendations of the proxy advisor are not in the best interest of the
company. Simply requiring the two perspectives to be published side-byside would improve the quality of the work done by the advisor (which
has no interest in being caught in absurdities) and better educate investors
deciding how to cast their votes. The board has the greatest incentive,
and is in the best position, to point out the ways in which the assumptions
underlying the Voting Guidelines may sometimes fail to generate good
corporate governance.

174. This issue is discussed in Bryce C Tingle, "Proxy Advisory Firms," supra note 10; see also
Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), surveying the empirical data that demonstrates the failures of

democratic voting as a governance alternative to markets-an argument directly relevant to corporate
governance, and Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, 1st ed (San Francisco, CA: BerrettKoehler Publishers, Inc, 2012), discussing the limitations of shareholder-centric corporate governance
generally.

